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THE STATES OF IMMIGRATION

RICK SU*
ABSTRACT
Immigration is a national issue and a federal responsibility. So
why are states so actively involved? Their legal authority over
immigration is questionable. Their institutional capacity to regulate
it is limited. Even the legal actions that states take sometimes seem
pointless from a regulatory perspective. Why do they enact legislation
that essentially copies existing federal law? Why do they pursue
regulations that courts are likely to enjoin or strike down? Why do
they give so little priority to the immigration laws that do survive?
This Article sheds light on this seemingly irrational behavior. It
argues that state laws are being pursued less for their regulatory
impact and more for their ability to shape federal immigration policy
making. States have assumed this role because, as alternative policy
venues, they offer political actors a way to reframe the public perception of an issue and shift debates to more favorable ground.
Moreover, states are able to exert this kind of influence without
having to legally implement or effectively enforce their laws. This
theory offers an explanation for why states have so frequently been
drawn into policy disputes over immigration in the past, such as
those that led to the major immigration reforms of 1986 and 1996.
It also casts new light on more recent state responses, such as
Arizona’s controversial 2010 immigration enforcement law.

* Associate Professor of Law, SUNY-Buffalo Law School; B.A., Dartmouth College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Jim Gardner, Jerry Frug, David Baron, and Anthony
O’Rourke for their particularly insightful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to
thank Hiroshi Motomura, Carissa Hessick, Kate Griffith, Kerry Abrams, Jim Wooten, John
Schlegel, Kathleen Kim, and Melinda Molin for their probing questions and perceptive
comments. All mistakes are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Is federalism in crisis? Looking at the recent controversies over
immigration, one might presume that it is. Federalism is ordinarily
imagined to require a clear delineation between matters delegated
to the federal government and those left to the states.1 And for more
than a century, immigration has been widely recognized as both a
national issue and a federal responsibility.2 Yet in recent years
there has been an avalanche of state activity on this issue. Since
2005, states have enacted more than one thousand laws concerning
immigration.3 States like Arizona and Alabama have drawn national attention and controversy by enacting elaborate enforcement
schemes that are both comprehensive in scope and at odds with
existing federal policies.4 Through legal challenges, the federal government has sought to defend its policy-making authority and prevent the emergence of a patchwork of state standards.5 Emboldened
by the congressional paralysis over federal immigration reform,
however, states are not only more active but they are also more

1. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000) (“The Constitution requires
a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”).
2. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
3. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS
AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JANUARY - JUNE) (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.
ncsl.org/documents/statefed/IMMIG_REPORT_FINALAUG9.pdf.
4. See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts
535, § 9; S.B. 1070, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010,
ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070; see also 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 450 (specifying in the
preamble that the law is based on the theory of “attrition through enforcement”); Plaintiff's
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof at 1-2,
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01413-SRB)
(arguing that Arizona’s immigration enforcement law threatened federal policy by adopting
a comprehensive and competing approach to immigration). Though the official short title of
S.B. 1070 is “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” see 2010 Ariz.
Sess. Laws at 468, this Article uses the popular short title “S.B. 1070.”
5. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (federal lawsuit against
Arizona’s immigration enforcement law); United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282
(N.D. Ala. 2011) (federal lawsuit against Alabama’s immigration enforcement law), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
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influential.6 As such, the “free-for-all” in immigration policy making
continues.7
Alas, the prospect of untangling this jurisdictional knot is
remote—not because the legal questions are difficult, but because
this kind of jurisdictional jostling is simply how policies in a federal
system are made. Seeking specific outcomes, political actors have a
strong incentive to draw states into contentious policy disputes,
even when there may not appear to be a matter of state concern.
This is because state policy making can shift the locus of a policy
dispute, reframe the underlying issue, and build support for a
particular position.8 Moreover, it can have this effect even if the
resulting laws are never legally implemented or even effectively enforced. It is no wonder that political actors of all kinds—from federal
policymakers and national political organizations, to local officials
and individual advocates—frequently turn to states to overcome
political obstacles that they face. In short, as a matter of political
strategy, states are often called upon to shape policy outcomes in
ways that may require them to step outside their legal authority as
lawmakers or even their institutional competence as regulators.9
I call this strategic use of states “venue-shifting,” and I argue that
it sheds light on the role and influence of states in immigration
policy making. Contrary to common perception, state involvement
in immigration regulation is hardly unprecedented. States were
actively involved in the years before the federal government enacted
comprehensive immigration reforms in 1996. The enactment of state
laws also surged in the run-up to the reforms of 1986. The state
laws that emerged in these two instances not only complemented
legislative efforts at the federal level, but they also became the
baseline for the federal laws that followed. And they were able to do
all this without ever having much of a regulatory impact.10 As I
demonstrate below, venue-shifting better explains the long involve-

6. See Peter Nicholas, Arizona Law Reshaping Reform Push, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010,
at A7.
7. Editorial, Stopping the Free-for-All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at A34.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See generally ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOVERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1995).
10. See infra Part II.
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ment and ongoing influence of states in immigration than traditional principles of federalism.11
I lay out venue-shifting as a theory in Part I. It is outlined generally and with reference to examples from many policy contexts in
order to demonstrate the theory’s robustness and broad applicability. I offer venue-shifting in part to supplement—and in part to
challenge—traditional views on the federalism relationship between
the federal government and the states, from those that see it largely
as a matter of constitutional design to those that organize it around
principles of institutional competence.12 Yet I also derive my theory
from the basic structure of our federal system and the incentives
that it creates for political actors. Simply put, our federal system
provides many opportunities for states to become involved in a variety of policy disputes, and political actors compete to seize them as
a means of attaining tangible policy outcomes.
Part II turns to the issue of immigration. Here, I apply venueshifting to a specific policy setting and plumb the theory for insights
on the role of states in immigration policy making. I start here with
an examination of the history of state involvement since the late
nineteenth century, through which I show that the basic assumptions of my theory hold true in the immigration context. Then I turn
to two case studies that examine how state activity influenced the
enactment of two comprehensive immigration reform measures: the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)13 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act of
1996 (IIRIRA).14
Part III examines how venue-shifting as a theory of state involvement holds up today. Here too, I apply the theory to two case
studies. The first is the proliferation of state enforcement mandates,
such as the controversial 2010 Arizona law recently considered by
the Supreme Court.15 The second looks at the simultaneous rise in
state laws granting benefits to undocumented immigrants, which
11. See infra Part I.
12. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 23-61 (1995);
Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
459 (2007).
13. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
14. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
15. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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has shaped the federal debate about granting legal status and
citizenship to certain undocumented immigrants.16 Through these
case studies, I show that emerging immigration controversies continue to follow the same script. I also use the case studies to make
some predictions about what the future might hold for the state
immigration laws of today.
Part IV discusses the implications of venue-shifting as a theory
of state involvement for federalism generally and “immigration
federalism” specifically. Through this, I show how the insights of
venue-shifting challenge or complicate the current thinking about
the relationship between the federal government and the states.
This Part is followed by a brief conclusion.
I. VENUE-SHIFTING AND THE ROLE OF STATES
Political actors are always looking for opportunities to strengthen
their position in a policy dispute. I argue that states offer a powerful
tool for doing so. Their involvement can shift the locus of a policy
debate. Their influence can alter how the underlying policy question
is framed. The reality of political competition dictates that, for any
given issue, there is at least one side eager to alter the terms of a
debate in these ways. This is why, I suggest, states are so often involved in controversial policy disputes, especially those that do not
appear at first glance to be matters of state concern.
I refer to this political strategy as “venue-shifting,” and I argue
that it explains the role and influence of states in policy disputes at
all levels of our federal system. This theory does not attribute state
involvement to the idiosyncrasies of particular states; nor does it see
states defined by how jurisdictional boundaries are drawn. Rather,
venue-shifting theory posits that the policy-making role of states is
a function of our federal system and the incentives that this structure creates for political actors. Moreover, it suggests that the main
effect of state involvement is not always regulatory. In other words,
state laws cannot always be taken at face value; sometimes their
16. See Stella M. Flores, State Dream Acts: The Effect of In-State Resident Tuition Policies
and Undocumented Latino Students, 33 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 239, 240-41 (2010); see also
Jennifer Medina, Legislature in California Is Set to Pass a Dream Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2011, at A16.
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most important function is as a means of shaping policy at the
federal or local level.
I outline this theory of state involvement in the following three
Sections. First, I show that the structure of our federal system
provides many opportunities for states to become involved in controversial policy disputes. Second, I argue that political actors compete to seize or foreclose these opportunities as a means of shaping
policy outcomes. Third, I compare venue-shifting to more traditional
federalism theories about the role of states in our federal system.
A. The Structure of the Federal System
My explanation for why states are repeatedly drawn into controversial policy disputes is derived from two observations about the
structure of our federal system. First, it provides a number of policy
venues in which substantive policies can be made. Second, the jurisdictional boundaries that divide these venues are surprisingly fluid,
which allows enterprising political actors tremendous room to navigate a variety of policy disputes. As the next Section illustrates,
competition over how disputes are positioned in this manner has
historically been an important part of how significant policy developments are made.17 Here, I look at how states contribute to this
dynamic in our federal system.
States matter because they greatly expand the venues in which
policy is made. This is furthered by the fact that each state offers a
number of different policy venues to choose from—from the traditional division of power among the executive, the legislature, and
the courts, to the growth of administrative agencies at the state
level.18 When local governments are added to the equation, the
number of policy venues in our federal system expands exponentially. In short, the number of states in our federal system offers a
diverse range of possible staging grounds for political mobilization.19
The importance of these policy venues for political actors lies not
just in their numbers but also in their diversity. Whether at the
17. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
18. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 13-14 (2008).
19. See id. at 14.
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federal or the local level, each venue provides a different roster of
participants, from the decision makers themselves to those who are
capable of influencing the proceedings.20 Whether a court or agency,
each policy venue also offers different policy-making routines, from
how the agenda is set to how decisions are made.21 Combined with
the unique partisan makeup of different venues in every state, an
institutional outlet for a wide range of positions likely exists. In
other words, at any given point in time, political actors on all sides
are likely to find certain policy venues that are more advantageous
than others in pursuing their cause.
It helps that the jurisdictional boundaries between policy venues
at the federal and state levels are more fluid than conventional legal
analysis might suggest. The reason for this is twofold. First, few
clear or consistent lines delineating spheres of federal and state
power exist.22 To be sure, federalism is often viewed as a sorting
scheme for policy issues: national matters to the federal government, local concerns to the states.23 In practice, however, the lines
are notoriously difficult to draw and even harder to enforce. From
education24 and financial regulation25 to housing26 and environmental protection,27 nearly every significant policy issue today is
regulated at multiple levels in our federal system.28 Moreover, jurisdictional assignments tend to rely as much on an ever-changing set

20. See Frank R. Baumgartner & Bryan D. Jones, Agenda Dynamics and Policy
Subsystems, 53 J. POL. 1044, 1047 (1991).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 214-15 (2005). For an
argument that the Constitution was never intended or designed to establish clear boundaries
between federal and state power, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM,
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 191 (2007).
23. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1889).
24. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY
L.J. 125 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Johnathan Mathiesen, Note, Dr. Spitzlove or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love “Balkinization,” 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 311.
26. See, e.g., John Kincaid, From Cooperation to Coercion in American Federalism:
Housing, Fragmentation and Preemption, 1780-1992, 9 J.L. & POL. 333, 371-79 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 166-73 (2006).
28. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 243, 301-15 (2005) (discussing examples of the interrelatedness of federal and state
governments in modern federalism).
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of legal frameworks as they do on how a policy issue is conceptually
framed at any given moment.
Second, mutual delegation and intergovernmental collaboration
have further undermined the significance of jurisdictional boundaries. As government programs and regulatory regimes become
more complex, their implementation is increasingly dependent upon
intergovernmental cooperation across the entire federal system.29
This integration not only makes jurisdictional lines less significant,
but it also increases the mutual influence that policy venues have
on one another. For instance, because the federal government relies
heavily on states to carry out public assistance programs like
Medicare, states now have tremendous influence over how these
programs are designed and implemented.30 Similarly, because states
have become dependent on federal grants, the federal government
has the ability to steer state policy making even when it cannot
control it outright.31
None of the features outlined here describe states in the way that
they are commonly portrayed: as independent and separate sovereigns.32 Taken together, however, they outline a federal system in
which the role and influence of states is arguably more expansive,
especially with respect to policy matters that are not traditionally
understood to be within the province of states qua states.33 In other
words, by providing a number of ways for enterprising political
actors to shift policy disputes into venues at the state level, the federal system creates strong incentives for political actors to consider
the involvement of states in their policy-making strategy. I now turn
to a closer examination of these incentives.
29. See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 214-15.
30. See generally CAMMISA, supra note 9 (discussing the active role of states as
policymakers in the federal system).
31. See MICHAEL D. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM 156-57, 160-63 (1972); JOSEPH F.
ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER 11617 (2008).
32. E.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Appointment and the Prohibition on
Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 183 (2002).
33. Many scholars have commented on the role of states in this regard, albeit through
different theoretical lenses. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 98-101,
104-08 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1284-92 (2009); Paul W. Kahn, Comment, Interpretation and Authority in
State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1161-63 (1993); Erin Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2011).
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B. The Incentives of Political Actors
The structure of our federal system provides many opportunities
for states to become involved in a number of policy issues. This
Section argues that political actors compete to seize or foreclose
these opportunities as a means of shaping how policy matters are
resolved. Disadvantaged political actors have strong incentives to
look to states as a means of strengthening their position in a policy
dispute. At times, political actors seek state regulations as an alternative avenue to policy making; this is often the case when, for
example, political actors want to challenge federal policies. In other
situations, political actors use state involvement to alter how the
underlying policy issue is framed, which can have a tremendous
impact on the outcome even if the final policy resolution is made
elsewhere. Both of these uses will be discussed in more detail below.
Venue-shifting assumes that political actors are interested primarily in results. To be sure, motivations may differ: whereas one
policymaker might be angling for votes, another might be genuinely
committed to a cause. All political actors, however, are invested in
tangible policy outcomes.34 As such, they are not likely to be deterred by federalism principles or jurisdictional boundaries if a policymaking opportunity presents itself. Given multiple options, political
actors are likely to shoot as high as they can—few would turn their
back on the chance at making national policy. But political actors
will also in most cases take whatever they can get, especially if they
can leverage intermediate steps into political victories higher up.
Mayors interested in gun control are not likely to be content with
local legislation if state or federal restrictions are possible.35 Yet
national political organizations seeking to legalize same-sex
marriage nationwide will likely be more than happy to pursue it at

34. See David S. Law, Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 2 (2006).
35. See Elizabeth A. Harris, Bloomberg’s Gun-Limits Coalition Grows, but Finds a Hard
Sell in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A19 (describing efforts of the organization
“Mayors Against Illegal Guns” at the federal level); Jennifer Steinhauer, At State Level, More
Attempts to Limit Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A1 (describing the influence of “Mayors
Against Illegal Guns” on state gun laws).
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the state level first, especially if they believe it will build political
momentum for more far-reaching policies down the road.36
In this respect, venue-shifting is not a procedural technique that
lies outside the world of substantive policy making. Rather, it is a
vital part of the policy-making process itself. This is especially true
in contentious disputes. Political actors recognize that significant
policy victories are rarely won solely on the merits or persuasiveness of a proposal. As Elmer Schattschneider has argued, it is often
how the scope of an issue is defined that ends up being the most
important determinant of how it will eventually be resolved.37 More
recently, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones showed that often
the easiest way to shift the scope of an issue is simply to change the
institutional venue in which the policy-making dispute takes place.38
Indeed, looking at the history of policy making, it is often through
precisely this kind of jurisdictional manipulation that significant
policy developments are made.39
Venue-shifting to states is most effective when it is used as an
alternative route to policy making. This is particularly true when
the most direct route is blocked. Proposals that fail to gain traction
at the national level, such as same-sex marriage, or at the local
level, such as property tax caps, might make notable gains at the
state level.40 In this way, states can provide a valuable stepping
stone to policy outcomes. For those facing political roadblocks at the
federal level, states provide a means of stepping down an issue to
build political support, expand the scope of participants, and showcase policy proposals on more favorable grounds.41 Conversely, for
those mired in local conflicts involving several communities, states
36. See James Dao, State Action Is Pursued on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2004, at A24 (discussing how both sides of the same-sex marriage debate are using state
forums to pursue nationwide goals).
37. See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST ’S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 2-8 (1975).
38. See Baumgartner & Jones, supra note 20, at 1045, 1047-48.
39. See id. at 1049-53.
40. See ROGER L. KEMP, HOW AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS WORK: A HANDBOOK OF CITY,
COUNTY, REGIONAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL OPERATIONS 260-63 (2002) (describing politics of
property tax caps); GARY MUCCIARONI, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT POLITICS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE
IN THE STRUGGLES OVER GAY RIGHTS 243-51 (2008) (discussing successes and failures of samesex marriage at the state and federal levels).
41. See, e.g., MUCCIARONI, supra note 40, at 243-44 (describing this phenomenon in the
context of same-sex marriage).
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provide a means of stepping up an issue, contracting the scope of
participants, and resolving it unilaterally at a higher level.42
A good example of this is the antinuclear energy movement in the
United States. Faced with a federal agency—the Atomic Energy
Commission—that was both eager to promote civilian nuclear power
and averse to public input, opponents were nevertheless successful
in forestalling the expansion of nuclear power in the 1970s and
1980s by leveraging sensational challenges at the state level: in
state legislatures, before public utility commissions, and through
ballot initiatives.43 Another example is the state-based strategy
pursued by critics of educational funding disparities and exclusionary zoning policies. After losing their landmark constitutional
challenges before the Supreme Court in the 1970s,44 both movements achieved a surprising measure of success by advancing similar legal challenges on state constitutional grounds in state courts
throughout the country.45
States are also an effective means for political actors to consolidate their political gains by foreclosing challenges from rivals at the
local level. This is especially useful when it is difficult for them to
win in a particular local jurisdiction, or because it would take too
much effort and too many resources to win in every community
where opposition might be mounted. Consider, for example, the
battle over gay and lesbian rights in the 1990s. When local governments began to take the lead by providing benefits to domestic
partners and passing legislation to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, opponents in many states took aim by
enacting state laws that repealed those local efforts directly, or by
42. See, e.g., KEMP, supra note 40, at 263 (describing this scenario in the context of
property taxes).
43. See Baumgartner & Jones, supra note 20, at 1053-58; Patrick A. Parenteau,
Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants: A Constitutional Dilemma for the States, 6 ENVTL. L. 675,
675-78 (1976).
44. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977)
(rejecting a claim of discrimination involving zoning policies); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to educationfunding disparities).
45. For education cases, see, for example, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d
1353, 1357 (N.H. 1997); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
For exclusionary zoning, see, for example, S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 731-32 (N.J. 1975).
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challenging the authority of local governments to implement these
policies without explicit authorization from the state.46 More recently, energy companies engaged in hydraulic fracturing—or
“fracking,” which is a new and controversial means of natural gas
extraction47—have also turned to states as a way of circumventing
their opponents. As antifracking advocates have challenged gas
drilling by turning to local zoning bans on a town-by-town basis,
energy companies have responded by pushing for controversial land
use laws at the state level that would effectively strip local jurisdiction over the issue altogether.48
Even when states are unable to claim significant policy-making
authority on a given issue, however, there is still a powerful incentive for political actors to seek out their involvement for two reasons. First, states remain prominent political platforms upon which
arguments foreclosed in other institutional venues can be voiced.49
This is especially true in national politics in which state laws have
often been used to call attention to a political issue, maintain political pressure, or demand a federal response.50 Second, efforts to
draw states into a controversy often require substantial effort to reframe the underlying policy issue as one of state concern.51 Though
this may not succeed as a legal matter, it may still be influential on
how the public perception of the issue is framed going forward.52
Both of these are long-term strategies in which the impact of state

46. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24, 633-36 (1996) (overturning a Colorado law
that was enacted in order to overturn local antidiscrimination statutes in Denver, Boulder,
and Aspen); Arlington Cnty. v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 708-09 (Va. 2000) (overturning a county
policy providing healthcare coverage to “domestic partners” because the power to recognize
same-sex unions lies in the state).
47. See Matt Willie, Comment, Hydraulic Fracturing and “Spotty” Regulation: Why the
Federal Government Should Let States Control Unconventional Offshore Drilling, 2011 BYU
L. REV. 1743, 1744.
48. See Sabrina Tavernise, As Gas Drilling Spreads, Towns Stand Ground over Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, at A20.
49. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Laws, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1326-28 (2009).
51. Cf. Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the “Transitory” Cause of Action, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 36, 61 (1959) (“From the standpoint of the state’s concern for the welfare of its own
people ... the place of injury ... [is] a mere incident.”).
52. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Health Care Case As Race Heats Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A1.
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involvement in a policy issue is not always immediately apparent.
But, as a step towards specific policy outcomes, states are often just
as effective in shaping policies even if they are not in a position to
make policies themselves.
Take, for example, two issues in which states play a prominent
role even though their regulatory authority is limited: the longstanding controversy over abortion and the recent political battle
over the 2010 healthcare reform law.53 Since Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973, the boundaries of abortion regulation have effectively
become a matter of federal constitutional law.54 Similarly, although
the twenty-six states that sued to block implementation of the 2010
healthcare reform law raised interesting legal questions about the
“individual mandate,”55 it is clear that the law’s future will ultimately depend on what Congress and the President do in the next
several years.56 In neither of these cases are states positioned to
become the primary policymakers in the foreseeable future. Yet that
has not diminished the influence that they have been able to exert.
For decades, a constant stream of state laws on abortion have
pushed the boundaries of Roe, served as the basis for federal legislation, and kept the issue of abortion politically salient.57 Similarly,
by challenging the implementation of the 2010 healthcare reform
law, states have not only been able to fuel a contentious national
debate over the law but have also been successful in framing the
debate almost entirely around the individual mandate.58
The state’s role in framing a policy dispute is also evident in the
context of the medical marijuana debate. Not long ago, marijuana
53. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
54. 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (establishing a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
as a federal right).
55. See Liptak, supra note 52, at A1.
56. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
57. See Devins, supra note 50, at 1326-30. These efforts were not local in nature. As
venue-shifting predicts, national political actors played a significant role in urging state
action. See Jongho Roh & Donald P. Haider-Markel, All Politics Is Not Local: National Forces
in State Abortion Initiatives, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 15, 20-22 (2003).
58. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Role of State
Resistance in Health Care Decision-Making, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 73 (2011); Elizabeth
Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health
Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 155 (2010). For an analysis of the legal issues behind
Virginia’s main lawsuit, see Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 55, 56-58 (2012).
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was viewed entirely through the lens of the federal war on drugs.59
The prospect of legalization or decriminalization was thought to be
impossible in American politics.60 Yet today, not only are these
alternatives being seriously considered but the sale of marijuana is
also starting to be discussed as a potential source of tax revenue, its
production and distribution as a promising economic growth sector,
and its legalization as a way to redirect law enforcement resources.61
This reframing was brought about almost entirely by the rise of the
medical marijuana movement at the state level, which has thus far
found success in several states.62 This was possible even after the
Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed drug policy as a matter of
federal law, which preempted any state effort to provide a medical
exception.63 It is still too early to tell how this conflict between
federal and state law will be resolved. Even if the federal government decides to assert its authority over this field by aggressively
cracking down on the proliferation of marijuana dispensaries,64 it
will likely be unable to change the fact that the political framing of
the issue has already changed substantially because states became
actively involved. The real impact of state involvement will then
ultimately be in how it shapes policy decisions at the federal level
in the years to come.65
Disadvantaged political actors have strong incentives to look to
states to advance their policy objectives. This is true even if their
ultimate goal is to effectuate reforms at a higher level. State policies
may not always be their first preference. But given the realities of
political competition, there is usually at least one side in a given
59. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 11-15 (2005).
60. See, e.g., Robert MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Exploring Drug Depenalization: The Next
Step After Proposal 1, 13 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 449, 457 (2009).
61. See, e.g., Michael Berkey, Note, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal
Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 417, 445-47 (2011).
62. Id. at 428-31, 438-47.
63. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 29-32.
64. See Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15; Jennifer Medina, U.S. Attorneys in California Set
Crackdown on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at A10.
65. There are some in Congress that seem to be inclined to see this issue partially
devolved as well. See The Marijuana Bill, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., June 26, 2011, available
at 2010 WLNR 12718559 (“A bill introduced by Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., and Rep. Ron
Paul, R-Texas, would let states legalize, regulate and tax marijuana, limiting Washington’s
role to cross-border and interstate smuggling enforcement.”).
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policy dispute eager to involve them as a means of strengthening
their position and securing victory at a higher level in the future. It
is for these reasons that states are so frequently drawn into controversial policy disputes, especially those that may not seem at
first to be traditional matters of state concern.
C. The Descriptive Limits of Federalism
Under my theory, states are frequently involved in policy disputes
at other levels of the federal system as a political strategy. These
are not, however, the only factors that go into determining the
policy-making role of states. Federalism theories abound that purport to establish the proper allocation of state power. Some believe
it should be based on the legal mandates of our constitutional
structure.66 Others believe it should be based on the specific institutional competencies of states, especially relative to those of the
federal government.67
I do not deny the usefulness of these theories. They do, however,
have one important limitation: although they might tell us a little
about whether it is constitutional or wise for states to regulate a
particular issue, they have limited influence on whether states will
do so. The reason for this is simple: the political influence that a
state law can exert on an ongoing policy dispute does not usually
depend on whether the law survives constitutional scrutiny or is
effectively enforced. Federalism theories may help us design an
ideal political system, but without changing the political incentives
that underlie our federal system, the actual behavior of states will
likely continue to be determined by strategic interests rather than
federalist principles.
Indeed, states do not seem to be inclined to stay within constitutional boundaries, no matter how clearly they are defined. This is
especially true when the very purpose of state involvement is to
66. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 12, at 23-24, 59-61.
67. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 781-84 (1995); Robert D. Cooter &
Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 115, 118-20 (2010); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 813, 817 (1998).
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challenge an existing federal policy or precedent. Some suggest that
clearer jurisdictional boundaries and more vigorous judicial
enforcement would deter the kind of federalism battles that so often
embroil controversial policy disputes.68 This, of course, assumes that
political actors are averse to legal controversy and dissuaded by
judicial sanctions. Unfortunately, this is not often the case, especially when testing legal boundaries and raising political controversy is the whole point. By pushing for state abortion laws that run
headlong into Roe v. Wade, political actors are not confused about
Supreme Court precedent or unaware that they run a high risk of
their laws being struck down. Indeed, the very purpose of these laws
is to challenge the existence or relevance of Roe and leverage
political pressure in favor of its repeal.69 The fact that they create a
sensational legal faceoff only enhances the law’s effectiveness in this
regard.
At the same time, states are not likely to be deterred from regulating in a particular field simply because they are not in the best
position to do so. This is especially true if raising political awareness
or pointing out shortcomings of existing federal policy is their goal.
Admittedly, venue-shifting assumes that political actors are interested foremost in results. It also recognizes, however, that they will
seek policy outcomes wherever they can get them, especially when
they can use them to build political momentum. Many policy issues,
undoubtedly, are simply not suited to regulation at the state level.
It might also seem wasteful that states are enacting laws that they
know are difficult for them to enforce. But it would be remiss to call
these laws pointless, just as these concerns are unlikely to deter
states from acting.
***
The venue-shifting theory of state involvement is not a prescriptive vision of how our federal system should be organized. It also
does not profess to be the purpose for which that system was
68. See generally E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists
and Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35 (2009) (describing how federalism affects
corporations and asking whether an institutional effort is needed to clarify the appropriate
dividing line between federal and state power).
69. See Devins, supra note 50, at 1326-28.

1356

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1339

designed.70 Instead, the goal of my theory is to offer a structural
explanation for why states behave the way they do in controversial
policy disputes. It is an attempt to explain why behavior that might
seem senseless and irrational through a normative perspective of
federalism actually makes perfect strategic sense from a political
perspective. I leave further consideration about the implications of
venue-shifting for federalism to Part IV. In the meantime, I turn to
how the theory holds up under case study.
II. STATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY MAKING
My argument thus far is that the federal structure explains the
involvement and influence of states in policy disputes at all levels
of the federal system. The theory offered to explain this is rooted in
the different ways that states are capable of shaping the policymaking process. It is also based on the incentives of political actors.
Here, I demonstrate the usefulness of this theory by employing it
to examine the controversial role of states in immigration policy
making.
The reason for focusing on immigration here is twofold. First,
given its legal status as an exclusive federal issue,71 immigration
offers a useful lens for testing the robustness of venue-shifting at
the margins. In other words, immigration represents a stringent
test because theoretically there should be no jurisdictional overlap
between the federal government and the states on this exclusively
federal issue. Nor are states in a legal position to actually make
immigration policy.72 But if their behavior is shaped more by political interests than legal boundaries, the expectation might nonetheless be that they would be drawn into the immigration controversy
as a means of influencing policy making at the federal level.73
Indeed, there is a long history of state involvement in immigration
70. Although, it is worth noting that two of the Founders, Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, opportunistically solicited state support in raising their challenge against the Alien
and Sedition Act of 1798, leading to a constitutional crisis. See ANDREW BURNSTEIN & NANCY
ISENBERG, MADISON AND JEFFERSON 337-38 (2010).
71. See infra note 79.
72. See Nathan G. Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of Federal
Standards in State and Local Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 47, 47 (2008).
73. See supra Part I.
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policy making, and states tend to become more active in the years
before significant federal reforms are made.
Second, venue-shifting offers valuable insights into many of the
peculiar ways that states actually respond to immigration. Specifically, it sheds light on puzzling behavior that traditional theories of
federalism have difficulty explaining: why states enact legislation
that essentially copies existing federal law; why states pursue
regulations that are likely to be enjoined or struck down by courts;
and why states so rarely prioritize the immigration laws that do
survive. Construed as acts of regulation, these behaviors seem
pointless and ineffectual, which is how legal observers often portray
them.74 Understood as a means of reframing the political debate,
these responses are not so easily dismissed. Indeed, as I outline
below, opponents of existing federal policy often turn to state regulations to call attention to federal laws that they believe are underenforced, to challenge federal policies they consider misguided, or to
urge the adoption of reform proposals they believe to be necessary.
State laws are often able to exert this influence without ever being
successfully implemented or effectively enforced.
In short, venue-shifting tells us a lot about the role of states in
immigration policy making. In the next two Parts, I demonstrate
this through a series of case studies. I begin by examining the
history of state involvement in immigration policy making. I then
turn to the role states have played in the two most recent comprehensive immigration reforms at the federal level. The first is the
wave of state employer sanction laws enacted in the years leading
up to the passage of the IRCA in 1986.75 The second focuses on the
passage of Proposition 187 in California, the burst of state activity
it generated, and its impact on the IIRIRA in 1996.76 Taken together, I suggest that state involvement in the immigration context
has long been driven by political actors seeking to reshape the
federal policy-making process.

74. See, e.g., Patrick S. Cunningham, Comment, The Legal Arizona Worker’s Act: A Threat
to Federal Supremacy over Immigration?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 412 (2010).
75. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
76. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
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Part III will pivot from these historical examples to today’s
immigration controversies. Most of the attention will be centered on
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the provocative immigration enforcement law
that inspired a wave of similar measures in states like Alabama and
whose constitutionality was the subject of a much anticipated
Supreme Court opinion.77 Part III will also focus on recent state
efforts to support undocumented immigrants and their effect on the
prospect of a new round of “amnesty” for undocumented immigrants.
Of particular interest are the in-state tuition laws that have been
enacted specifically to benefit undocumented students entering
higher education and the impact those laws have had on the development of the most widely supported legalization measure currently under consideration at the federal level: the Development,
Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act—better known as the
DREAM Act.78 Although both of these state immigration efforts are
still very much in progress, I show that they continue to adhere to
the same script that has guided state involvement in the past. By
examining these similarities, I offer some predictions about what
kind of impact these state efforts are likely to have going forward.
A. Immigration Policy Making in a Federal System
The theory of venue-shifting is derived from three observations
about the nature of policy making in our federal system: (1) our
federalism offers many opportunities for states to become involved
in a variety of policy disputes; (2) political actors look for these
opportunities in order to shape policy outcomes; and (3) states are
able to exert a policy-making influence without needing to have any
regulatory impact. As discussed in Part I, these structural features
underlie a diverse range of policy disputes, from nuclear power to
medical marijuana. I show here that they apply equally to the issue
of immigration.
To be sure, this position is not commonly held. Indeed, under a
formal view of federalism, states have no reason to be involved in
77. See S.B. 1070, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450; Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012).
78. The DREAM Act has been introduced several times. For the most recent version, see
DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011).
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immigration at all. The power to control immigration is a uniquely
federal responsibility. Given this, there should not be any state
regulation of immigration. States are also not in a position to effectively implement an immigration policy. As a result, they should
have little incentive to pursue them. Yet looking across the history
of immigration, not only do many instances of state involvement
exist, but they have also been quite influential on the course of
immigration policy making. The reason, I suggest, is because the
three fundamental features that underlie venue-shifting as a political strategy are also at play in the immigration context.
First, notwithstanding the constitutional origins of the federal
government’s plenary power over immigration,79 states have always
had plenty of opportunities to regulate immigration in practice. In
the absence of any significant federal regulations in the nineteenth
century, states eagerly filled the gap. A web of state laws limiting
the admission of criminals, paupers, lunatics, and the infirm operated as this nation’s first set of immigration restrictions,80 whereas
screening facilities like Castle Gardens in New York served as some
of our nation’s earliest advances in immigration enforcement.81 Both
of these would go on to become models for federal policy.82
State activity persisted even after the federal government began
to actively occupy the field of immigration in the early twentieth
century. At first glance, this may seem surprising given that it was

79. Constitutional support for federal immigration powers is usually justified with respect
to a combination of related delegated powers (the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization
Powers, the War Power, the Migration and Importation Clause, and the Foreign Affairs
Power), an appeal to inherent powers (national sovereignty), or with reference to the construction and structure of the Constitution (necessity, government structure, and citizenship).
See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 185-95 (4th ed. 1998); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE
JUDICIARY 182-92 (1987) (discussing several “sovereign” powers used to justify the exclusion
of aliens by the federal government).
80. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841-84 (1993) (examining the five major categories of immigration
policy implemented by state legislation prior to 1875).
81. See VINCENT J. CANNATO, AMERICAN PASSAGE: THE HISTORY OF ELLIS ISLAND 30-54
(2009) (providing a history of Castle Gardens).
82. See id. at 52-54 (discussing the transition from state to federal immigration
regulation); DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN
AMERICA 69 (2002) (noting that federal regulations “essentially nationalized state policies
governing European immigration that had been struck down by the Court”).
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already clear at this stage that immigration was an exclusively
federal issue. Nevertheless, state involvement was still possible
because what actually constituted an “immigration regulation” was
constantly in flux. When the federal government assumed control
over admission criteria and “head taxes” as a means of regulating
immigration,83 states did the same by turning to “alienage” regulations that discriminated against noncitizens in such areas as land
ownership and employment on government projects.84 When the
Supreme Court started to invalidate alienage laws as an impermissible regulation of immigration,85 states simply turned to more
informal means of exerting pressure. For example, by offering a
number of powerful incentives to depart, states like California and
Illinois were able to orchestrate the largest repatriation program in
the United States during the Great Depression.86 State regulations
continued to test the boundaries of the federal government’s immigration power well into the late twentieth century, even as the
scope of this power was expanding.87 Indeed, two of these efforts—
employer sanctions and benefit restrictions—will be examined in
more detail below. In sum, the fluidity of “immigration regulations”
as a legal category has provided states with many opportunities to
participate in immigration policy making.
Second, political actors have always had strong incentives to look
to states to support their efforts in shaping immigration policy. This
is because states have shown themselves to be quite influential
throughout the years. What is striking about the state efforts described above is how seamlessly they interact with policy developments at the federal level. In nearly every case, it appears that into
each new ground that states expand their efforts—bonding require83. See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE
FASHIONING OF AMERICA 192-93 (2006).
84. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 212-13 (1923) (land ownership); Crane
v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 195 (1915) (employment); see also, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v.
Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) (upholding local ordinance forbidding noncitizens
from operating pool and billiard rooms).
85. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1941).
86. See FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL:
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S, at 120, 125, 133, 149-51 (rev. ed. 2006); Kevin R.
Johnson, The Forgotten “Repatriation” of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and the Lessons for the
“War on Terror,” 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 4-10 (2005).
87. See, e.g., infra notes 104-10, 140-42 and accompanying text.
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ments, immigration inspections, alienage regulations, employer
sanctions—the federal government eventually follows.88 As I will
examine in more detail later, this often appears to be the case
because political actors press for reform at the state and federal
levels simultaneously. In other instances, however, states specifically prompt the federal government to act, as when state agitation
against the Chinese in the late nineteenth century eventually led to
a federal ban on Chinese immigration.89 In any event, history shows
that although states do not ultimately make immigration policy,
their actions have tremendous influence.
For political actors involved in immigration, the influence of
states is all the more important because of the volatility of immigration politics. Although exclusive federal control is often asserted as
a means of ensuring clarity and uniformity,90 competing priorities
and conflicting interpretations often mean that neither quality
exists in the federal implementation of our immigration laws.91 This
is especially true today as disagreements over immigration priorities lead to conflicts between the President and Congress and between successive presidential administrations.92 In these cases,
political actors cannot rely on continued success at the federal level,
or even on the expectation that a federal law that has already been
enacted will actually be prioritized. In this kind of volatile political
landscape, there is great assurance in knowing that alternative
means to influencing policy making and policy implementation
exist at the state level.
Third, although states have long been influential in immigration
policy making, that influence is not contingent on states actually
being able to legally or even effectively implement immigration
88. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1907-09 (2000) (discussing
early federal law reliance on state practices); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise
of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1581-82 (2008) (explaining
the growth of state activity in immigration law).
89. See ZOLBERG, supra note 83, at 180-84, 187.
90. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91-106 (1995) (describing how
individual states reflect their own individual state populations).
91. See id. at 137-38 (explaining that there is an “impatience with waste and overlap
inherent in dealing with governments on several levels instead of just one”).
92. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 464 (2009).
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regulations of their own. In many cases, state laws have their effect
simply by sending a political message. This is important because the
legal authority of states in the immigration context is constrained,
even if a legal case for their involvement can be made. States, moreover, have never been in a good position to enforce immigration
laws. Indeed, one of the main reasons states did not rise up in
protest against the federal government taking over their immigration responsibilities in the late nineteenth century was because they
knew federal coordination and resources would be much more effective than the patchwork screening system that existed at the
time.93 This rationale remains today.
Yet, given that their ultimate interest is often in shaping federal
policies, this knowledge rarely deters states. If anything, they are
emboldened to act with the knowledge that their actions are more
likely to provoke controversy. Courts overturned most of the antiChinese legislation that states enacted in the late nineteenth
century.94 The laws that did survive also had little impact on the
influx of Chinese immigrants.95 Nevertheless, this burst of legal
activity, accompanied by escalating violence, prompted a firestorm
of national attention that ultimately forced congressional action.96
This kind of state escalation and federal response would be repeated
time and time again: in response to immigrants from Japan, from
southern and eastern Europe, and from Mexico and the Americas.97
Indeed, as later Sections will illustrate, this appears to be precisely
the pattern that led to the enactment of two of the most important
federal immigration reforms in recent history.
In short, venue-shifting explains the role of states in shaping
federal immigration policy since the late nineteenth century. The
history of immigration policy making meets all of its underlying
assumptions. First, immigration is a federal responsibility, but the
93. See, e.g., LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 5-6 (1995).
94. See, e.g., In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359, 360-61 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890) (one of many cases
striking down anti-Chinese legislation).
95. See ZOLBERG, supra note 83, at 181-83.
96. See id. at 187.
97. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can
Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-27 (2007) (explaining how
“[s]tate laws ... are an important influence on Congress’s agenda”).

2013]

THE STATES OF IMMIGRATION

1363

fluidity of legal boundaries in this area provides states many
opportunities to get involved. Second, political actors have strong
incentive to look to states as a means of building political support
for federal policy, especially given the political volatility that surrounds the issue of immigration. And third, as a means of shaping
the immigration debates, the influence of states has not historically
been tied to whether state laws are legally enforceable or capable of
being effectively implemented. To be sure, this Section paints this
background in broad strokes. In the case studies to follow, each of
these elements are examined in much closer detail.
B. State Employer Sanction Laws and the Road to IRCA in 1986
This Section examines the road to Congress’s first significant
response to the problem of undocumented immigration. Specifically,
it focuses on the role that states played in the political negotiations
leading up to the enactment of the IRCA.98 The issue of undocumented immigration was actually created in large part by the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,99 which was meant to
liberalize our immigration system.100 By abolishing the nationalorigin quota system that had been in place for most of the twentieth
century, it opened America’s doors to immigration from many
regions that had been severely restricted or altogether foreclosed
before.101 But for the first time it also imposed a limit on immigration from countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico.102
Coupled with the expiration of long-standing guest worker programs,103 these legal changes set the stage for the rise of undocumented immigration.

98. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
99. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
100. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S.
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3004 n.162 (2006) (discussing
this perception).
101. Robert F. Blomquist, Thinking About Law and Creativity: On the 100 Most Creative
Moments in American Law, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 119, 126 (2008) (describing this facet of the
legislation as one of “the most creative moments in Anglo-American law”).
102. See ZOLBERG, supra note 83, at 332-35.
103. See id. at 334-35.
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1. The State Response
Agitation over undocumented immigration began soon after the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was enacted. Indeed,
California was soon in the spotlight for enacting the first employer
sanction law in the nation in 1971.104 Targeting the “employment
magnet” that many believed to be the main cause of undocumented
immigration, California made it illegal for employers to “knowingly
employ an alien ... not entitled to lawful residence in the United
States.”105 It also authorized state officials to investigate and impose
monetary sanctions against employers found to have hired undocumented immigrants.106 As the first of its kind, this employer sanction law incited considerable controversy and interest. It was soon
joined by similar laws in Connecticut and Kansas, which were
enacted in 1972 and 1973 respectively.107 Delaware, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire joined them in 1976,108 while Florida, Maine,
Montana, Vermont, and Virginia followed a year later.109 Louisiana
kept the issue alive by enacting its employer sanction law in 1979.110
Legal questions about the proper scope of state power in immigration drove much of the controversy over these laws. Indeed, the
legality of California’s action was challenged in court immediately
after it was enacted for infringing on the federal government’s
immigration powers.111 But the issue of employer sanctions tran104. Act of Nov. 8, 1971, ch. 1442, 1971 Cal. Stat. 2847 (repealed 1988).
105. Id. § 1(a).
106. Id. § 1(b).
107. Act of May 24, 1972, 1972 Conn. Acts 451 (Spec. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-51k (West 2012)); Act of Mar. 31, 1973, ch. 140, 1973 Kan. Sess. Laws 522 (repealed
2011).
108. Act of July 7, 1976, ch. 517, 60 Del. Laws 1793 (repealed 1995); Act of Oct. 20, 1976,
ch. 452, 1976 Mass. Acts 641 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19c (West 2012));
Act of May 26, 1976, ch. 31, 1976 N.H. Laws 42 (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:4-a
(2012)).
109. Act of Oct. 1, 1977, ch. 77-250, 1977 Fla. Laws 1192 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 448.09 (West 2012)); Act of Oct. 24, 1977, ch. 116, 1977 Me. Laws 170 (codified as
amended at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 871 (2011)); Act of Mar. 19, 1977, ch. 56, 1977 Mont.
Laws 239 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-305 (2011)); Act of May 5, 1977, 1977 Vt. Acts
& Resolves 320 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 444a (West 2012)); Act of Mar. 27, 1977,
ch. 438, 1977 Va. Acts 651 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-11.1 (West 2012)).
110. Act of July 18, 1979, 1979 La. Acts 1498 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:992 to :994 (2011)).
111. See De Canas v. Bica, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446 (Ct. App. 1974).
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scended the federal-state divide. By all accounts the campaign
for employer sanctions was concurrently waged at both levels.
Employer sanctions were considered in Congress as early as 1952,
and a bill was introduced in 1971 immediately following the enactment of the California law.112 Seizing upon California’s success,
Congress specifically devoted two days of hearings on the bill.113 An
employer sanction bill passed the House of Representatives before
expiring in the Senate in both 1972 and 1973,114 the same years that
Connecticut and Kansas enacted their versions.115 Federal efforts to
pass employer sanctions were repeated throughout the 1970s,
including a major push by President Carter in 1977, which was
precisely when state activity on this issue peaked.116 In short,
during the entire time that states were debating employer sanctions, a concerted effort was also in place to adopt them as federal
law. Moreover, these efforts were mutually reinforcing. Repeated
failures to enact employer sanctions at the federal level spurred
states to pursue legislation in their stead. At the same time, with
every successful enactment at the state level, pressure for federal
action mounted.
As a matter of political strategy, there was good reason for
supporters of employer sanctions to encourage state action on the
issue. This campaign for employer sanctions was also directed
towards states for another reason: it was an area of law in which a
convincing case for state involvement can be most easily made.
Although federal power over immigration had long been established,
indirect regulations that targeted the behavior of native residents
and businesses as a means of regulating immigrants—as employer
sanctions sought to do—were not yet a common feature of our immigration system.117 Moreover, employment regulations were still
112. See Kitty Calavita, California’s “Employer Sanctions” Legislation: Now You See It,
Now You Don’t, 12 POL. & SOC’Y 205, 205-06 (1983).
113. See id.
114. See Kitty Calavita, The Contradictions of Immigration Lawmaking: The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 11 LAW & POL’Y 17, 23-24 (1989).
115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116. See Calavita, supra note 114; Alan K. Simpson, The Politics of Immigration Reform,
18 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 486, 490-92 (1984).
117. See Stumpf, supra note 88, at 1583-84 (explaining that congressional attempts to
control illegal immigration through employer sanctions began in 1974 and gained prominence
in 1986 with the passage of the IRCA).
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widely seen at this time as a traditional matter of state concern.118
It was precisely because the issue of employer sanctions occupied
this jurisdictional overlap between traditional spheres of federal and
state power, however, that state involvement proved to be particularly effective. States were able to argue that their actions were
prompted by the failings of federal regulation and enforcement,
which were now seriously impacting a core interest of the state.119
They were also able to claim that their response was appropriately
tailored—by focusing on the action of employers, they limited their
regulatory efforts to traditional spheres of state power.120
These arguments proved influential when the question of state
employer sanctions reached the Supreme Court in the case of
De Canas v. Bica.121 In the state appellate court, the California law
was held unconstitutional because it “encroache[d] upon, and interfere[d] with, a comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its exclusive power over immigration.”122
In a surprising turn, however, the Supreme Court reversed. Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice Brennan began by stressing that not
every “state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power.”123 He then continued to hold that, absent explicit
federal legislation on the matter, the California employer sanction
law fell within the state’s general police powers and was not preempted by existing federal law.124 In addition to having technical
concerns about the scope of federal preemption, the Court was also
won over by the argument that the issue of employment regulation,
especially when the protection of workers was involved, was a traditional area of state concern. Indeed, the Court went as far as to
suggest that the economic impacts of undocumented immigrants on

118. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976).
119. See, e.g., id.
120. See Calavita, supra note 112, at 211-13.
121. 424 U.S. 351.
122. Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435, 444 (Ct. App. 1974). The
California court deciding De Canas cited Dolores in holding that the California law was “in
conflict with the national law and policy. These are remedies which ... may not be utilized by
the states.” De Canas v. Bica, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (Ct. App. 1974).
123. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
124. Id. at 356-57.
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the state’s fiscal interests and labor markets were “essentially local
problems.”125
2. The State Impact
De Canas was a landmark victory for states. And as predicted, the
decision led to an explosion of state laws prohibiting employers from
hiring undocumented immigrants.126 There was, however, one major
problem: there did not appear to be interest in actually implementing these laws at the state level.
For all the state effort put into enacting and defending state employer sanctions, there was little evidence that states cared about
their enforcement. Reviewing reported cases in 1984, one study
failed to find a single successful prosecution.127 A report published
in 1986 had more luck but still found only a handful of instances.128
To be sure, even with the Supreme Court’s blessing, state employer
sanction laws continued to face a number of obstacles to enforcement: resistance by lower courts, reluctance by local officials, and
noncooperation by federal authorities.129 Yet, as Kitty Calavita
argued with respect to the California law, it was already largely
“symbolic” the moment it was enacted.130
One might ask whether all this legislation was for naught.
Calavita titled an earlier report on California’s employer sanctions
“The Case of the Disappearing Law.”131 But the law never actually
125. Id. at 357.
126. Nine of the eleven states that enacted employer sanctions did so after 1974, when De
Canas was decided. See supra notes 108-10.
127. See Kathleen M. Johnson, Note, Coping with Illegal Immigrant Workers: Federal
Employer Sanctions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 968-69 & n.69.
128. ANNELISE ANDERSON, ILLEGAL ALIENS AND EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: SOLVING THE WRONG
PROBLEM 7 (1986), available at http://andrsn.stanford.edu/Other/illegal.html (“[A]s of 1983
neither California nor Florida had prosecuted any cases under their respective laws, and only
five convictions had been attained throughout the country in the eleven jurisdictions having
employer sanctions legislation.”); see also Carl E. Schwarz, Employer Sanctions Laws, Worker
Identification Systems, and Undocumented Aliens: The State Experience and Federal
Proposals, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 371, 382-83 (1983) (reporting that prosecution has only
occurred in two states—Montana and Virginia).
129. See Schwarz, supra note 128, at 383-91.
130. See Calavita, supra note 112, at 214.
131. See KITTY CALAVITA, CTR. FOR U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES, CALIFORNIA’S EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS: THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING LAW 3-4 (Research Report Series, 39, 1982)
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went away; it simply became federal policy. Indeed, nearly every
aspect of California’s employer sanction law survived as federal
provisions in the IRCA.132 Moreover, it continues as a cornerstone
of federal immigration law today, even as support for the other
components of IRCA—for example, broad legalization for undocumented immigrants—have faltered.133 In this respect, the immigration policy of eleven states became the new national baseline for
every state in the country—and not for the reasons offered by more
traditional accounts of federalism. These states did not serve as true
“laboratories” of policy experimentation134 in demonstrating the
wisdom or effectiveness of these laws. After their sensational enactment, there was no corresponding effort to actually implement
these laws. As a result, federal government action to reconcile an
emerging patchwork of competing state standards was not really
necessary. Nevertheless, none of this took away from the influence
that these state laws were able to exert on federal policy making.
In the enactment of IRCA, then, venue-shifting is once again used
as a political strategy. Because employer sanctions were an innovation in immigration regulation, states were able to claim jurisdiction
by exploiting the legal uncertainty about the federal government’s
occupation of the field. Political actors at the federal and state levels
were emboldened by state involvement because it kept the issue of
employer sanctions alive, and because it framed the issue of undocumented immigration around the so-called “employment magnet.”135
By shifting the locus of the immigration debate into state forums,
these state laws might have also made it easier to think about federal immigration regulations in a different light—not just at the
border but involved in regulations directed at the nation’s interior
as well.136 All of this was possible even though the political will and
(arguing that “the Arnett Law, for all practical purposes, has been repealed”).
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006); see also Stumpf, supra note 88, at 1590 (“Similar to the
California statute that served as its model, IRCA imposes criminal penalties, namely fines
and imprisonment, on employers with a pattern or practice of violating its provisions.”).
133. See Stumpf, supra note 88, at 1590-93 (remarking on the continued relevance in
contemporary society).
134. See infra notes 299-303.
135. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1512-13 (1995)
(recounting the “magnet” perception lasting into the 1990s).
136. See Stumpf, supra note 88, at 1583.
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institutional capacity required to implement these laws did not
exist. In the end, however, the ultimate success of these state efforts
was ensured not by their judicial victory in De Canas v. Bica but
rather in the political sphere through the enactment of IRCA in
1986.
C. Proposition 187, Reimbursement Lawsuits, and the Road to
IIRIRA in 1996
Despite its promises, IRCA did not resolve the undocumented
immigration issue. Legalization put millions of undocumented immigrants on the path to citizenship.137 Yet employer sanctions did
little to prevent the undocumented population from growing.138 By
the 1990s, political momentum for other ways of stemming the flow
of undocumented immigrants took hold, leading to the enactment of
the IIRIRA.139 I examine here the prominent role that states played
in the political negotiations that led to this significant reform of
federal immigration law. Indeed, the particular manner in which
states intervened in immigration policy making had a major impact
on how the problem of undocumented immigration was framed and
how IIRIRA was designed in response.
1. The State Response
California was once again at the center of state immigration
policy making in the 1990s. But unlike the employer sanction law
of 1971, its involvement came about through a different political
process: the ballot initiative. In 1994, a political organization named
“Save Our State” gathered enough signatures to place what would
become Proposition 187 on the California ballot.140 When it was first
introduced, the issue of undocumented immigration was not even
among the top ten issues that concerned California voters.141 After
137. See TICHENOR, supra note 82, at 261-62.
138. See id. at 262-63.
139. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
140. ROBIN DALE JACOBSON, THE NEW NATIVISM: PROPOSITION 187 AND THE DEBATE OVER
IMMIGRATION, at xiii, xvii (2008).
141. Nancy H. Martis, #187 Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and
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it won a decisive victory in September of the same year, however,
similar laws were considered in states across the country. The issue
of undocumented immigration rose to become a major issue in
California and on the national stage.142
Proposition 187 is best known for prohibiting undocumented
immigrants from receiving public social services, nonemergency
healthcare, and public education.143 The goal was twofold: first to
reduce the fiscal costs of undocumented immigrants, and second to
eliminate the public services and benefits that some believed to be
the “magnet” for undocumented immigration.144 Aside from these
provisions, Proposition 187 also contained a number of enforcementoriented measures. The law made it a felony offense to manufacture,
distribute, sell, or use false citizenship or immigration documents.145
It also required all law enforcement officials to verify the immigration status of anyone who was arrested and to otherwise fully cooperate with federal immigration enforcement efforts.146 Moreover, it
specifically forbade any local government or law enforcement agency
in the state from limiting or restricting the ability of its officials to
cooperate with federal authorities on immigration.147 This last provision is worth noting because it targeted so-called “sanctuary cities”
within California that had promulgated policies limiting local cooperation in federal immigration enforcement efforts.148 In other
words, for longtime opponents of local opposition to active immigraReporting., CAL. VOTER FOUND. (1994), http://www.calvoter.org/archive/94general/props/
187.html.
142. See ANDREW WROE, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND IMMIGRATION POLITICS: FROM
PROPOSITION 187 TO GEORGE W. BUSH 2-3 (2008).
143. Proposition 187’s initiatives are codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53069.65 (West 2012);
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215(a) (West 2006); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 2001);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(a) (West 1990).
144. See JACOBSON, supra note 140, at 84-85; see also Johnson, supra note 135, at 1512-13,
1539-40.
145. Phillip Martin, Documentation, Proposition 187 in California, 29 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 255, 255 (1995).
146. GOV’T § 53069.65; see also Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics,
Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance of Race, 70
WASH. L. REV. 629, 632-33 (1995).
147. GOV’T § 53069.65.
148. See, e.g., Ronald J. Ostrow, Big Cities Criticized for Failing to Cooperate with INS,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1993-11-11/news/mn-55561_1_
illegal-immigrants (describing the cities in California with nonenforcement policies prior to
Proposition 187’s enactment).
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tion enforcement, Proposition 187 was a way of stepping up this
issue from the local to the state level.
It is easy to think of Proposition 187 as a quirk of California politics. Yet this overlooks the extent to which Proposition 187 was
entangled with the national political conversation and national
political actors.149 The chief architects and financial supporters of
Proposition 187 were the Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR) and the Pioneer Fund—both major political organizations interested foremost in national policy reform rather than
immigration policies tailored to specific states.150 The authors of
Proposition 187 were prominent figures in federal politics: Alan
Nelson, who served as the Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) under President Reagan; and Harold
Ezell, who was the western regional commissioner for INS at the
same time.151 It was also clear that the authors of Proposition 187
were primarily interested in federal policies. Ezell argued that
“[t]here’s no need for another Proposition 187 in any other state if
Congress does its job.”152 Similarly, Nelson explained that the reason he included an education ban that ran headlong into the
Supreme Court’s precedent in Plyler v. Doe, which forbade states
from denying free public education to undocumented students,153
was precisely “to provoke court action. There’s nothing new about
getting decisions reversed when circumstances have changed, and
in immigration terms, we are a world away from 1982 [when Plyler
was decided].”154 Even California’s Governor Pete Wilson called for
a national version of Proposition 187.155
Although the original backers of Proposition 187 were primarily
interested in national policy, it also made sense for them to pursue
these specific reforms through state politics. California offered a
prominent political platform for these proposals and a convenient
149. See JACOBSON, supra note 140, at xvii-xviii (examining the political battles and tension
that developed around Proposition 187).
150. Id. at 111-14; WROE, supra note 142, at 80-82.
151. WROE, supra note 142, at 57-61.
152. Id. at 117.
153. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
154. Herman Schwartz, Op-Ed., The Constitutional Issue Behind Proposition 187, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 9, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-10-09/opinion/op-48272_1_illegalimmigrants.
155. See WROE, supra note 142, at 117.
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mechanism for placing them before a large electorate. Moreover,
states like California were in a good position to claim jurisdictional
authority. By focusing on the fiscal costs of immigration and the
public benefits that immigrants received, Proposition 187 tapped
into an emerging jurisdictional overlap between the federal
government and the states.156 Immigration may be a federal matter,
but the provision of social services and public benefits was a major
state concern.157 Facing major budget deficits, Governor Wilson
quickly seized upon Proposition 187 to cast blame on the federal
government for California’s fiscal woes.158 That point was further
strengthened when the State filed a sensational lawsuit against the
federal government demanding reimbursement for the cost incurred
by undocumented immigrants, which the State portrayed as a
federal responsibility.159 From this perspective, immigration could
be sensibly understood as a matter of “states’ rights.” As Governor
Wilson argued in support of Proposition 187: “California will not
submit its destiny to faceless federal bureaucrats or even congressional barons.... California is a proud and sovereign state, not a
colony of the federal government.”160
Backed by national political organizations and cast as a matter of
state concern, Proposition 187 triggered a wave of political activity
in states across the country. After its introduction in California,
efforts to adopt similar legislation under the “187” moniker spread
to fifteen other states including Arizona, Washington, Oregon, and
Florida.161 To be sure, none of these efforts would ultimately prove
156. See Johnson, supra note 135, at 1539-40.
157. See Kristen M. Schuller, Note, Equal Protection and the Undocumented Immigrant:
California’s Proposition 187, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 308-09 (1996) (making this
argument for constitutionality).
158. See WROE, supra note 142, at 48.
159. See JACOBSON, supra note 140, at 71; see also California v. United States, 104 F.3d
1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 1997).
160. William Claiborne, Wilson Challenges Hill to Match His Hard Line, WASH. POST, Jan.
10, 1995, at A7. Many leaders in the federal government began to embrace this message. See,
e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, House Votes to Reimburse State Prison Costs, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
1995, at A16 (quoting then-House Speaker Newt Gingrinch: “I really do believe [it] is a federal
responsibility because I think that if the federal government fails to secure the borders, it’s
unfair to simply dump on one or two states the burden of federal failure.” (alteration in
original)).
161. See Ann Davis, The Return of the Nativists, NAT’L L.J., June 19, 1995, at A1
(discussing the rise of state attempts to pass anti-immigration statutes modeled after
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successful in the two years between Proposition 187’s enactment
and the federal response in 1996.162 Yet the political controversy it
generated in states all across the country cannot be easily dismissed. In addition, the sense of political crisis was heightened by
a series of sensational lawsuits filed by state and local officials
seeking federal reimbursement for benefits and services provided to
undocumented immigrants. Florida took the lead by filing suit in
April 1994,163 with California following shortly after.164 Later, officials filed similar suits in New York,165 New Jersey,166 Arizona,167
and Texas.168 As the lawsuits proliferated, the legal claims were no
longer restricted to undocumented immigrants; many of the later
cases started to allege that the federal government had failed to
internalize the fiscal costs of legal immigration as well.169
2. The State Impact
Proposition 187 and the rash of reimbursement lawsuits that it
triggered had tremendous political influence on the development of
federal immigration policy in the 1990s. None of this, however, was
due to their legal or regulatory impacts. The various state lawsuits
seeking federal reimbursement were all dismissed on the merits or
as nonjudiciable.170 Proposition 187 did not fare much better. Its
enactment was immediately denounced by local officials in California’s largest cities, many of whom refused to implement its proviCalifornia’s Proposition 187).
162. See, e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell, Anti-Illegal Immigration Proposition Fails to Qualify
for Arizona Ballot, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1996-0715/news/mn-24427_1_illegal-immigrants (describing the failure of “Arizona 187” and “Florida
187” to make it onto the ballot).
163. See Raymond Tatalovich, Official English as Nativist Backlash, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!:
THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 78, 93 (Juan F.
Perea ed., 1997); see also Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995).
164. See California, 104 F.3d 1086; Tatalovich, supra note 163, at 93.
165. Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996).
166. New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996).
167. Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997).
168. Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997).
169. See, e.g., Appellants’ Brief at 3-5, Padavan, 82 F.3d 23 (No. 95-6156) (seeking
compensation for the “disproportionate impact on New York of otherwise legal immigration
to the United States and the massive and uncontrolled influx of aliens” (emphasis added)).
170. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
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sions.171 In any event, there was no need for them to do so: all of
Proposition 187’s central provisions were enjoined by federal courts
almost immediately after it was enacted.172 Given that Proposition
187 was drafted in part to challenge Supreme Court precedent, the
legal challenge against the law was, of course, anticipated and welcomed.173 Yet when the injunction was finally ripe for appeal in
1998, the State instead sought a mediated agreement that maintained the injunction.174 In the years since the enactment of
Proposition 187, California’s leadership had changed and the state
was no longer supportive of the law.175 Thus, by the 1990s, Proposition 187 was all but dead as a legal matter.
The legal challenge against Proposition 187 led to its demise. It
did not, however, dampen Proposition 187’s impact—nearly every
one of its provisions had already become federal law. The comprehensive reforms of 1996, which included the passage of the IIRIRA
and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), were based explicitly on the same benefitrestriction theme that underlaid Proposition 187 and the state
reimbursement lawsuits. With the sole exception of public education, undocumented immigrants were specifically denied all the
public services and benefits that Proposition 187 identified.176 As
PRWORA explained, it was now “a compelling government interest
to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the
availability of public benefits.”177 But federal law also went further.
The new laws imposed severe restrictions upon legal immigrants to
ensure that “the availability of public benefits not constitute an
incentive for immigration to the United States.”178 Receipt of federal
171. Editorial, Why Proposition 187 Won’t Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at E14.
172. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
173. See Schwartz, supra note 154.
174. See WROE, supra note 142, at 109-10.
175. See id. at 108.
176. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-670 to -689 (“Restrictions on Benefits for
Aliens”); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-77 (“Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens”).
177. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 400(6) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(6) (2006)).
178. Id. § 400(2)(B) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(B)).
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benefits was curtailed.179 States were also authorized to do the same
for their own programs, including making distinctions between
different categories of legal immigrants in ways that had been
questioned by the Supreme Court.180
Benefit restrictions, however, were not all that Proposition 187
and the comprehensive reforms of 1996 shared. Federal law also
incorporated the various enforcement measures contained in
California’s initiative. Criminal penalties were increased and new
crimes were created for those that either used or enabled the use of
false identity documents to claim immigrant admission, public
benefits, or employment.181 Federal law also adopted Proposition
187’s “anti-sanctuary” provision, barring any state or local official
from refusing to participate in federal immigration enforcement
efforts.182 Federal lawmakers went further to encourage verification
of immigrant status at the state and local level by requiring federal
agencies responsible for immigration to respond to any and all
inquiries from state and local officials.183 Indeed, taken as a whole,
it appeared that the federal law incorporated nearly all the provisions of Proposition 187 in one way or another. Moreover, federal
policy was beginning to reflect the idea that states and localities
might play an important enforcement role as well.
The enactment of IIRIRA in 1996 showed how state involvement
was capable of shaping federal immigration policies. States were
able to exert this influence without having to implement any
regulation or actually prevail in a legal challenge. At the most basic
level, Proposition 187 and the state lawsuits that followed served as
an important political platform for drawing public attention to the
issue of undocumented immigration and setting forth a proposal
about how it should be handled. As noted earlier, when Proposition
187 was first introduced, immigration was not especially prominent
as a matter of state or national concern.184 Party leaders were also
179. Id. § 401 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1611).
180. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 553; see also Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 381-83 (1971).
181. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 334.
182. Id. § 642(a)-(b).
183. Id. § 642(c).
184. See Martis, supra note 141; see also JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., THE
CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 212 (1999).
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wary of delving into the issue.185 Much of that changed with the
introduction and success of Proposition 187 at the polls.186 If it was
possible to ignore the issue before, these state activities demanded
federal attention on immigration.187 In this respect, political actors,
like the authors of Proposition 187 and California Governor Wilson,
were able to leverage a ballot initiative into a national controversy
that made federal reforms much more likely.
State activity also influenced the types of reform that arose by
reframing the issue of immigration in the political conversation. If
the “employment magnet” was the theme of the 1980s, prompted in
large part by the state employer sanction laws that led up to that
debate,188 Proposition 187 and the reimbursement lawsuits centered
the focus in the 1990s squarely on the issue of the so-called “benefits
magnet.”189 Proposition 187 enshrined the theory that immigrants
were entering the U.S. illegally to take advantage of social services
like public education and welfare.190 The emphasis on the fiscal costs
of immigration after the introduction of Proposition 187 cannot be
understated: questions about the financial strain of immigration
and the relative burdens that each level of government had to bear
dominated the political debates leading up to the 1996 reforms.
Proposition 187 was bookended by three major reports about what
burdens immigrants imposed on states and localities.191 As a result,
nearly all of the political commentary and academic discourse were
185. See, e.g., WROE, supra note 142, at 64.
186. See GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 184, at 201-02.
187. See, e.g., Frank del Olmo, Perspective on Proposition 187: Muddle Now Yields to
Congress, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, at M5 (arguing that the loss of Proposition 187 in court
“has virtually guaranteed that Congress will now finish rewriting the nation's immigration
laws”).
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. See Johnson, supra note 135, at 1512-13.
190. See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dietrich, When Others Get Too Close: Immigrants,
Class, and the Health Care Debate, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 300-05 (2010)
(demonstrating the link between public fears about the economic burden of immigrants in
California, the eventual enactment of the federal immigration reforms of 1996, and the belief
that “immigrants to the United States were motivated by the opportunity to obtain social
benefits”).
191. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-22, ILLEGAL ALIENS:
ASSESSING ESTIMATES OF FINANCIAL BURDEN ON CALIFORNIA (1994), available at http://www.
gao.gov/archive/1995/he95022.pdf; REBECCA L. CLARK ET AL., THE URBAN INST., FISCAL
IMPACTS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: SELECTED ESTIMATES FOR SEVEN STATES 50, 56 (1994);
DONALD HUDDLE, CARRYING CAPACITY NETWORK, THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION (1993).
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focused on the accuracy of these findings and what implication, if
any, they should have on how our immigration policy should be
reformed.192
As was the case in 1986, states also appeared to play an important role in setting the agenda for immigration policy making in
1996. States entered the conversation by focusing on the impact that
immigration had on the states’ traditional responsibilities over education, healthcare, and public benefits. Through this window, they
ignited a contentious public debate that centered on the fiscal cost
of immigration and the need to increase penalties on those that
supported undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, they did this
in the absence of any real regulatory effect.
There is one twist to the success of states in this particular case,
however: it may have actually hurt the fiscal interests of the states
in the long term. Although the 1996 reforms gave states the authority to deny undocumented and legal immigrants certain public
benefits, they also pulled the federal government out of funding
federal means-tested programs for those immigrants as well.193 This
comported with the political message that states were sending about
“benefits magnets.” But it also meant that if states wanted to provide some assistance to legal immigrants, they would have to do it
without any federal matching funds. This was precisely what happened. Not only did nearly every state ultimately decide to provide
some of these benefits but they did so entirely from their own
coffers.194 Because of the tremendous cost that this imposed on
states, federal amendments were eventually introduced that re-

192. See generally, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-133, ILLEGAL
ALIENS: NATIONAL NET COST ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY (1995), available at http://www.
gao.gov/assets/230/221495.pdf; JEFFREY S. PASSEL, TOMÁS RIVERA CTR., HOW MUCH DO
IMMIGRANTS REALLY COST? (1994); David Simcox et al., The Costs of Immigration: Assessing
a Conflicted Issue, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 1994), http://www.cis.org/articles/
1994/back294.htm. For a summary and comparison of these studies, see Susan Gonzalez
Baker et al., Fiscal Impacts of Mexican Migration to the United States, in AT THE CROSSROADS:
MEXICAN MIGRATION AND U.S. POLICY 145, 156-73 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1997).
193. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 400(5), (7), 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (announcing the national policy of alien “selfrelian[ce]” as the “least restrictive means” for states “mak[ing] determinations concerning the
eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits”).
194. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 515-17 (2001).
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stored federal funding for some but not all of these benefits.195 Not
surprisingly, states played an important role in these changes as
well.
***
To summarize, the involvement and influence of states in the
enactment of IRCA in 1986 and IIRIRA in 1996 demonstrate that
the venue-shifting theory is a useful framework for understanding
state involvement in immigration. In neither of these cases did it
appear that states were acting according to more traditional theories of federalism: as laboratories of policy experimentation196 or as
independent sovereigns focused on local issues.197 The history of
immigration policy making shows the powerful impact states can
have on the development of federal immigration policy and why
political actors seize these opportunities when they appear. This
influence is also not dependent on whether state regulations are
legally enforceable or even capable of being effectively implemented.
Thus, arguments about jurisdictional boundaries or institutional
capacity are unlikely to have much of an effect on the behavior of
states or how political actors use them. The role of states in this
regard, of course, is not new. When it comes to state involvement,
IRCA and IIRIRA share many similarities to earlier immigration
developments. One issue remains: whether this is just history or
whether it continues to be relevant today.
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
How does venue-shifting hold up today? As the immigration
debates enter the twenty-first century, states are once again in the
spotlight. Many observers believe, however, that this time is different. One reason for this thinking is the sheer number of immi-

195. See Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-185, §§ 503-504, 112 Stat. 523, 578-79 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A),
(F) (2006)) (restoring eligibility of some legal immigrants for food stamps); Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 5301-5308, 111 Stat. 251, 597-603 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (restoring eligibility of some legal immigrants for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits).
196. See infra notes 299-303.
197. See infra notes 304-09.
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gration-related laws that have been enacted at the state level.198
Another reason is the growing severity of state responses, with
many states competing over the title of having the “toughest” laws
on immigration.199 In these respects, the stakes of state involvement
today seem more than just political.
It is always difficult to examine an ongoing political controversy:
passions are high, details unclear, and outcomes uncertain. Even so,
there are many signs to suggest that states today continue to follow
the familiar script of venue-shifting. States are finding opportunities for participation, including jurisdictional overlaps that have
been created by federal policy in recent years.200 Political actors at
all levels of the federal system—including repeat players that have
spearheaded state efforts in the past—continue to seize these
opportunities with an eye towards broader federal outcomes.201
Moreover, none of the tremendous political impacts associated with
these state laws have depended on their regulatory impact.202
Indeed, all the signs thus far suggest that venue-shifting is at play.
This Part demonstrates the continuing relevance of venueshifting and uses it to make predictions about what kind of impact
states’ activity will have in the next round of comprehensive
immigration reforms. First, I examine Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the most
prominent state enforcement measure that has been enacted in
198. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Political Battle on Immigration Shifts to States, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2011, at A1 (“[A]t least five states plan to begin an unusual coordinated effort to cancel
automatic United States citizenship for children born in this country to illegal immigrant
parents.”).
199. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1 (“Gov. Jan Brewer of Arizona signed the nation’s toughest bill on
illegal immigration into law on Friday.”); Mick Hinton, States Double Migrant Laws, TULSA
WORLD, Aug. 8, 2007, at A4 (“Oklahoma's immigration measure is reportedly the nation's
toughest.”); Tim Hoover, Immigration Restrictions Get Bipartisan Support: Missouri Senate
OKs Bill, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 27, 2006, at B1 (“The bill, which now can go to the House,
represents the toughest set of restrictions on undocumented immigration lawmakers have
approved so far.”); Campbell Robertson, Part of Alabama Immigrant Law Blocked, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2011, at A13 (“The [Alabama] law, considered the toughest state immigration law in
the nation, was signed by Gov. Robert Bentley in June.”).
200. See Jordan Jodré, Preemptive Strike: The Battle for Control over Immigration Policy,
25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 551, 568 (2011) (“[F]ederal statutes, such as the INA and IRCA ... have
been clear in expressing that the states’ role in administering and enforcing immigration
policy and law was not fully abrogated to the federal government.”).
201. See, e.g., infra note 284 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
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recent years. I show that by “mirroring” federal law, S.B. 1070, and
other copycat legislation, has called attention to federal provisions
its supporters believe to be underenforced, provoked a sensational
legal challenge to existing federal policy, and generated both support and opposition to increased immigration enforcement efforts.
Next, I show how political actors are using states to advocate on
the other side, against an enforcement-only response to immigration. This includes noncooperation policies and other state efforts to
resist participation in federal immigration enforcement initiatives.
I also show how a series of state laws that provide in-state tuition
for undocumented immigrants has helped reframe the immigration
debate in support of a new round of “amnesty” or legalization of the
presence of certain undocumented students through the Federal
DREAM Act. If enforcement advocates are turning to state laws for
support in the run-up to the next comprehensive immigration reforms, those in favor of a more restrained approach are doing the
same.
A. Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and State Enforcement Mandates
In the spring of 2010, Arizona thrust itself into the national
debate over immigration. At issue was the enactment of S.B. 1070,
an enforcement-oriented measure touted as the toughest immigration law in the country.203 To be sure, S.B. 1070 was not the first
comprehensive state effort to regulate immigration in recent years.
Before its enactment, both Missouri and Oklahoma had passed
major immigration enforcement laws.204 And since S.B. 1070’s enactment, states including South Carolina, Indiana, Georgia, and
Alabama have passed copycat legislation that goes even further.205
Nevertheless, Arizona quickly became the poster child for state
203. S.B. 1070, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450; see also Nicholas Riccardi, Arizona
Passes Strict Border Rule, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at A1 (“Arizona law makers on Tuesday
approved ... the toughest measure in the country against illegal immigrants.”).
204. See Hinton, supra note 199, at A4 (“Oklahoma’s immigration measure is reportedly
the nation's toughest.”); Hoover, supra note 199, at B1 (“The bill, which now can go to the
House, represents the toughest set of restrictions on undocumented immigration lawmakers
have approved so far.”).
205. See Brian Lawson, Law Puts State at Center of Debate on Immigration, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2011, at 11 (describing Alabama’s immigration law—the latest Arizona
copycat bill following others in Georgia, Indiana, and South Carolina).
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activism on immigration. The public response to S.B. 1070 was
overwhelming. Legal commentators and policymakers endlessly dissected and fiercely debated its provisions.206 Supporters and critics
clashed over the consequences of its enactment on the airwaves and
in the streets.207 Even today, there is little agreement on the legality
or wisdom of S.B. 1070.208 All sides seem eager, however, to cast the
controversy in the familiar framework of federal power versus
states’ rights.209
“Attrition through enforcement” and “inherent authority” are the
two theories behind S.B. 1070. The first posits that even if the
removal of all the undocumented immigrants in this country directly
is impossible, a serious and concerted effort to effectuate enforcement would convince many to leave rather than live in constant fear
of detection.210 The second argues that state and local officials have
the “‘inherent authority’ to enforce federal immigration laws” without direct federal authorization.211 The goal was to greatly expand
immigration screening beyond what is currently possible by relying
on state and local law enforcement, and S.B. 1070 was an attempt
to codify that goal. The law mandates that all state and local law
enforcement officials directly participate in immigration enforcement by checking for immigration status in specific circumstances,
such as when an individual has been placed under arrest or during
lawful police stops when there is reasonable suspicion that an

206. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate
Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010); Kris W. Kobach, Why Arizona Drew a Line, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at A31; see also Will Arizona’s Immigration Law Survive?, N.Y. TIMES
ROOM FOR DEBATE (Apr. 26, 2010, 7:24 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
04/26/will-arizonas-immigration-law-survive.
207. See Julia Preston, Fueled by Anger over Arizona Law, Immigration Advocates Rally
for Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at A22; Kirk Semple, 3-Day Fast Supports Immigration
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2010, at A29.
208. Compare Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510-11 (2012) (striking portions
of S.B. 1070 as unconstitutional), with id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (arguing that S.B. 1070 is within the realm of state sovereignty).
209. See, e.g., Linda Turley-Hansen, 1070 Ruling Just More Fuel for States’ Rights War,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2010, at 22.
210. See Julia Preston, 11.2 Million Illegal Immigrants in U.S. in 2010, Report Says; No
Change From ’09, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, at A15.
211. See Suzy Khimm, The Man Behind Arizona’s Immigration Law, MOTHER JONES (May
7, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/05/kobach-arizona-immigration-law.
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individual is unlawfully present in the United States.212 It also
prohibits local governments and police departments in the state
from deprioritizing immigration enforcement and makes them
subject to civil lawsuits by any resident of Arizona if they do.213
Moreover, it creates a number of state penalties for conduct in
support of undocumented immigration, such as the harboring or
transportation of unauthorized aliens,214 which essentially copies
existing federal prohibitions.215
S.B. 1070 has another distinction: it was the first of the recent
state laws on immigration directly challenged by the federal
government.216 A little more than two months after S.B. 1070 was
signed into law and weeks before it would go into effect, the
Department of Justice took the unprecedented step of filing a
constitutional challenge against it and requesting an injunction to
block its enforcement.217 In doing so, the federal government argued
that the Arizona law was not only directly preempted by existing
federal law but that it also impermissibly infringed upon the federal
government’s exclusive power to set national immigration policy.218
On the basis of that argument, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against many, though not all, of S.B. 1070’s
provisions,219 a decision that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.220 In a split decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the
federal government and struck down many of S.B. 1070’s provisions
but upheld the controversial immigration enforcement mandate.221
Given the federal lawsuit and the manner in which it has been
portrayed, the controversy over Arizona’s S.B. 1070 appears to be a
classic federalism battle between the federal government and the
states. As the federal government argued in its case against
Arizona, even more important than the individual provisions of S.B.
212. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012).
213. See id. § 11-1051(F)-(H).
214. See id. § 13-2319; see also id. §§ 13-1509, 23-212.01, -214.
215. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(A) (2006).
216. See Supreme Court Decision on SB 1070, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER, http://www.
nilc.org/USvAZimplications.html (last updated June 25, 2012).
217. See Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 4, at 2-3.
218. See id. at 12-15.
219. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995-1006 (D. Ariz. 2010).
220. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 2011).
221. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510-11 (2012).
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1070 was the fact that Arizona enacted a comprehensive legislative
scheme that represented a unique policy position for how immigration should be regulated and enforced.222 Further, the federal
government stressed the danger this law posed to federal uniformity, especially if other states followed Arizona’s lead in enacting a
series of similar or, even worse, dissimilar, state policies on immigration.223 Arizona played its part. Not only was the text of S.B.
1070 clear in stating that its purpose was to effectuate a clear policy
of “attrition through enforcement,”224 but its sponsors have described the law’s passage as a direct challenge to existing federal
policy and administration.225 All the while, the mantra of “states’
rights” has served as a rallying cry for its supporters.
1. The Roots of S.B. 1070 and the Rise of State Enforcement
Mandates
Although a traditional federalism framework has dominated the
legal discussion of S.B. 1070,226 this Section argues that venueshifting offers a more accurate analysis, especially with respect to
the law’s political motivations and legal impacts. The name of the
original lawsuit against S.B. 1070—United States v. Arizona—
suggests a dispute between federal and state. Yet looking at the
amici that filed briefs when the case was on appeal before the
Supreme Court—eighty-one members of Congress in support of
Arizona against the federal government227 and cities in Arizona in
support of the federal government against their own state228—a
222. See Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 4, at 1-3.
223. See id.
224. S.B. 1070, ch. 113, § 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450 (stating the legislature’s
intent).
225. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Immigration Bill Reflects a Firebrand’s Impact, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at A12.
226. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Papers, Please: Does the Constitution Permit the States a
Role in Immigration Enforcement?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 584-86 (2012) (criticizing
the Ninth Circuit’s decision with respect to S.B. 1070 as “a fundamental conceptual
misunderstanding of federalism”).
227. Brief Amici Curiae of Members of Congress Brian Bilbray et al. in Support of
Appellants and Partially Reversing the District Court at 1, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d
339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645).
228. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Arizona Cities of Flagstaff et al. in Support of PlaintiffAppellee at 4-5, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645); Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the
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more complicated political framework appears at play. Here, I examine three aspects of S.B. 1070: the political actors behind it, the
federal policies that led up to it, and the peculiar way it imitates
existing federal law. Through this I suggest that far more important
than considering whether it was constitutional or enforceable is
recognizing that S.B. 1070 was foremost a political move in the
federal struggle over the future of immigration policy.
First, given the emphasis S.B. 1070 places on empowering states
to enforce immigration laws, it is easy to assume that it faced
federal opposition from the start. But the theoretical roots of S.B.
1070—“attrition through enforcement” and “inherent authority”—
actually began at the federal level. They were drawn from federal
immigration policies after 9/11, which strongly supported expanding
state participation in immigration enforcement.229 They were also
proposed by federal officials, the most prominent of which is Kris
Kobach, who at the time was the special advisor on immigration to
Attorney General Ashcroft during the second Bush administration
but had since become the architect behind S.B. 1070 and nearly
every state law on immigration in recent years.230 Indeed, for a
number of years, the federal government was pushing for states to
impose enforcement responsibilities upon their law enforcement
officials.231 The Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
issued an infamous memorandum that espoused “inherent authority” as a legal theory.232 Ashcroft and other federal officials invoked
it to call for more state action.233 It was only when federal support
City of Tucson in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at 2-7, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645).
229. See, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Latina/o-ization” of the Midwest: Cambio de Colores
(Change of Colors) as Agromaquilas Expand into the Heartland, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
343, 364 (2002).
230. See Tony Dokoupil, America’s Deporter in Chief, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 2011, at 6-7; Julia
Preston, A Professor Fights Illegal Immigration One Court at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2009, at A10.
231. See Mike Allen, Bush Orders New Crackdown on U.S. Border, POLITICO (Aug. 9, 2007,
8:53 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0807/5323.html.
232. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NonPreemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens
for Immigration Violations 7-8 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/
ACF27DA.pdf.
233. See Jerry Markon, ‘Hard Look’ at Immigration Law, WASH. POST, May 18, 2010, at
A17.
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stalled in 2005 that Kobach and FAIR—the national organization
also responsible for Proposition 187234—began to turn to state and
local laws as an alternative means of pushing these theories.235 And
as their actions have shown, Kobach and FAIR have always been
more interested in national policy outcomes than states’ rights.
Although championing state laws that target undocumented immigration, they challenged other state laws under federal preemption
doctrine for being too accommodating to undocumented immigrants.236
Second, there are also signs that states got involved in the enforcement context because of the jurisdictional overlap between
federal and state authority. To be sure, enforcement is often thought
to be one of the most exclusively held of the federal government’s
immigration powers.237 Even so, delegation to and reliance on states
to carry out this responsibility has increased over the years,238 which
has eroded the traditional federal-state divide in this area. Recall,
one of the goals of IIRIRA in 1996 was to prohibit states from
refusing to participate in immigration enforcement.239 IIRIRA also
took many steps to encourage the federal government to look at
state participation, including the creation of the 287(g) program—
which deputizes state and local law enforcement officials as federal
immigration agents240—and a legal mandate requiring the federal
government to respond to all state and local inquiries about

234. See supra text accompanying note 150.
235. See Preston, supra note 230, at A10.
236. See id. (“Mr. Kobach lost a suit against Kansas to block a statute allowing illegal
immigrants to pay in-state tuition rates in public colleges. But he won a similar case in
California; it is now before that state’s highest court.”).
237. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498-99 (2012); see also supra note 79.
238. See Allen, supra note 231.
239. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 133 (2006));
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2006)); see also City of N.Y. v.
United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that the federal government can bar
state and local government policies that seek to inhibit immigration enforcement by state or
local officials).
240. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); see also LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT 14-18 (2009), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf.
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immigration status.241 Even today, the federal government is pursuing federal initiatives that rely on joint efforts by federal and
state law enforcement, like Operation Community Shield242 and
Operation Secure Communities.243 From this perspective, Arizona
and others may be taking a controversial step in mandating
immigration enforcement. But in light of recent federal encouragement to participate, it was not as large a step as it might have been
in decades past.
Third, as venue-shifting predicts, there are signs that S.B. 1070
and similar state laws are explicitly designed to call attention to the
limits of existing federal policy. And because this time around the
complaint is not about the lack of regulations but rather the lack of
enforcement,244 it makes sense that S.B. 1070 essentially copies
existing federal law instead of innovating new regulations. To be
sure, states selectively choose which federal laws to copy and
which to ignore. As such, the “mirror” that they are creating is just
one of many interpretations of federal policy and how it should
be enforced.245 But that is the point. Rather than creating a new
regulatory framework, state laws are being used here to offer
commentary on federal law. Indeed, there was always a sense that
even if S.B. 1070 was the law being challenged in court, it was the
federal government’s response to immigration that S.B. 1070 aimed
to put on trial.

241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
242. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the
“Criminal Street Gang Member”, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 327-33.
243. See More Questions About the Secure Communities Program, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER
(Mar. 2009), http://www.nilc.org/secure-communities-2009-03-23.html; Secure Communities,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_ communities (last visited
Feb. 13, 2013).
244. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
245. Of course, to say that states are mirroring federal law is not to say that differences in
approaches between federal and state laws do not exist. Nor is it necessarily true that state
immigration laws that mirror federal laws are necessarily constitutional as a matter of federal
preemption, as some have argued. Compare Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law:
What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 47577 (2008), with Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation
of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 253-61 (2011).

2013]

THE STATES OF IMMIGRATION

1387

2. The Preliminary Impact of State Enforcement Mandates
It is widely assumed that the central issue with respect to state
enforcement mandates is whether states are constitutionally
allowed to regulate immigration in this manner. The Supreme Court
answered that question in Arizona v. United States, which upheld
and struck down portions of the law.246 Because of the split decision,
both sides claimed victory in the outcome.247 At the same time, the
Supreme Court left many legal questions unanswered, going so far
as to invite further litigation to settle many of these details once the
upheld portion of Arizona’s law is actually put into action.248 Thus
far, state and local involvement in immigration enforcement have
not appeared to change all that much since the Supreme Court’s
decision. As a result, many are holding their breath in anticipation
of the next development in this ongoing saga.
But even while we wait to see what consequences, if any, Arizona
v. United States will have on how federal immigration laws are
enforced in this country, it may be argued that the most significant
impact of S.B. 1070 and other state enforcement mandates has
already been made. As our earlier case study of state employer
sanction laws, Proposition 187, and the state reimbursement lawsuits suggest, the ultimate legacy state enforcement mandates will
likely have is how they affect federal policies to come.249 This is
particularly true here because laws such as S.B. 1070 are so dependent on federal cooperation. Even if these laws survive judicial scrutiny, federal policy can always be changed to limit state involvement
or to require more supervision of their activities. If, for example, the
federal government decides to adopt a different deportation priority,
state laws can do little if the federal government opts not to accept
the suspected immigrants that the state refers. The main question
then is how these state immigration laws will shape federal policies
down the line.

246. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
247. See Julia Preston, Justices’ Decision a Narrow Opening for Other States, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2012, at A12.
248. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
249. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2.
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From this perspective, it can be argued that S.B. 1070 has already
changed the political landscape. It has reframed the immigration
issue around the wisdom and effectiveness of enforcement, particularly the theory of “attrition by enforcement.”250 Moreover, it did so
long before the constitutionality of S.B. 1070 was even decided. Lest
it be forgotten, S.B. 1070 ignited a firestorm of controversy about
our nation’s immigration policy—one that dominated media channels and public discourse for months. It prompted an immediate
federal response both in Arizona and across the country.251 Even
today, as more states have followed in Arizona’s footsteps and attempts have been made to broker a federal immigration compromise, S.B. 1070 continues to be a benchmark by which many of
these efforts are measured.252 Even with all the talk about “states’
rights,” there appears to be little interest among states to actually
oust or replace the federal government in the regulation or enforcement of immigration. These state enforcement mandates have, if
anything, been more interested in prompting more federal enforcement action, not in telling the federal government to back off and let
states take over. It is hard to say that this strategy has not worked.
In fact, with record high deportation in 2010,253 it appears that the
federal immigration administration received the message.
There is, however, another side to how state enforcement laws
have shaped the national conversation on immigration. Critics have
also effectively used these laws as a rallying point for those who
support a more measured approach to immigration enforcement.254
They have been able to leverage the controversy over state laws to
call attention to the dangers of federal enforcement initiatives. The
250. 2012 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney explicitly adopted “attrition
through enforcement.” See Eric Stirgus, Romney Consistent on Views of Immigration, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Feb. 7, 2012, at B1.
251. See, e.g., Randall C. Archibold, National Guard Will Be Deployed to Aid at Border,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A1; Helene Cooper, White House Talk Lightens Tone of Dispute
on Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2010, at A12; Peter Nicholas, In Pivot, Obama Plans
Immigration Bill Push, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 2010, at 18.
252. See Editorial, It Gets Even Worse: New Anti-Immigrant Laws Are Cruel, Racist and
Counterproductive, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2011, at A18; Peter Nicholas, Arizona Law Reshaping
Reform Push, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at A7.
253. Julia Preston, Deportations from U.S. Hit a Record High, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at
A21.
254. See Preston, supra note 207, at A22.
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E-Verify program, an effort to create a national database of immigrant—and citizenship—status for all U.S. residents, was being
developed and slowly rolled out with little public awareness until
state laws began mandating its use.255 With the increased attention
that it received as a result, E-Verify’s future is now uncertain.256
Similarly, although S.B. 1070 sought to deflect fears about racial
profiling by specifically incorporating federal standards on the use
of race in immigration enforcement,257 the law also drew increased
attention to how paltry those federal standards actually are.258 All
the while, frustration about the lack of federal reform is building on
all sides. When or if reform will come remains unclear, but these
state laws make it all the more likely.
B. Sanctuary, In-State Tuition, and the Federal DREAM Act
Given the case studies offered thus far, it makes sense that immigrant advocates are particularly concerned about state involvement.
Indeed, I have focused on state laws centered on immigration
enforcement precisely because those are the laws that have had the
most tangible impact on federal policies since 1965. Yet these are
not the only kinds of policy making that states or local governments
have engaged in. In recent decades, critics of federal immigration
255. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2012) (mandating use of E-Verify); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 71-11-3 (2011) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-20 (2011) (same); see also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-60-6 (2012) (requiring certain employers to register with and utilize the federal work
authorization program). For a critique of E-Verify, see Rachel Feller, Comment, Preempting
State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona’s Improper Legislation in the Field of
“Immigration-Related Employment Practices,” 84 WASH. L. REV. 289, 289-92, 310-16 (2009).
But see Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Trust but E-Verify, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A19 (arguing
now that Arizona’s 2007 employer verification law has “been implemented, it might just be
a model for nationwide reform”).
256. See Miriam Jordan, E-Verify Bill Against Illegal Workers in Doubt, WALL ST. J., Sept.
21, 2011, at A6.
257. See, e.g., S.B. 1070, ch. 113, § 2, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 451, amended by Act of
Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070 (whereby race may be considered “to the
extent permitted by the United States ... Constitution”).
258. Gabriel J. Chin & Kevin R. Johnson, Profiling’s Unlikely Enabler: High Court Ruling
Underpins Ariz. Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at A15; see Casey Newton & Ginger Rough,
Law Is Revised in Effort to Allay Concerns About Racial Profiling, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 1,
2010, at A1 (“Our law mirrors federal law. So, why is it bad for Arizona to mirror federal law?
No one was crying out in the wilderness about the federal law being wrong or racial profiling.
I don't get it. It’s spin.”).
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enforcement and supporters of legalization have also turned to these
venues for support, especially when they faced political obstacles at
the federal level. Sanctuary measures limiting state and local
participation in immigration enforcement is one example. Another
is state efforts to offer benefits and services to undocumented immigrants, including the growth of state laws offering lower “in-state”
tuition rates at public universities for undocumented students. This
Section will focus on the impact of these two developments from a
venue-shifting perspective.259
1. State and Local Resistance to Federal Immigration
Enforcement
As far back as the late 1970s, cities began implementing policies
that limited the ability of their officials to inquire into immigration
status or cooperate with federal immigration officials.260 These
policies proliferated, however, in the 1990s and early 2000s as federal immigration enforcement efforts became increasingly reliant on
state and local officials.261 Although a couple of states adopted such
policies statewide, they largely exist at the local level, and primarily
in major cities.262 Nevertheless, state resistance to federal immigration efforts has also expanded in other ways. In recent years, states
have begun to challenge federal programs that require state and

259. But there are other examples as well, such as Utah’s immigration law, which
specifically encourages the federal government to expand guest-worker programs to offer more
opportunities for immigrants to enter the United States on a legal basis. Compare Illegal
Immigration Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws 261, with Utah Immigration Accountability
and Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws 228, 236 (establishing a state immigrant worker
permit), and Utah Pilot Sponsored Resident Immigration Program Act, 2011 Utah Laws 256.
All three of these bills were signed on the same day as part of a grand legislative compromise.
For an analysis of these provisions, see Utah: Going Down Arizona’s Unconstitutional Path,
NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.nilc.org/utah-bills-analysis-2011-03.html.
260. See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627, 1639 (1997) (noting that the 1970s “sanctuary movement” prompted several provisions
in the IIRICA).
261. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1086 (2004) (discussing the FBI’s role in advising local police
in making immigration arrests).
262. See, e.g, Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 142 n.59
(2008) (mentioning New York City and Seattle as cities that have adopted “sanctuary”
policies).
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local participation;263 New York has also experimented with “pardon
panels” as a way of exempting certain immigrants from being
deported for minor state crimes or dated convictions.264
Venue-shifting is more complicated with respect to state and local
resistance to federal enforcement compared to the other cases
examined thus far. This is because it involves another significant
layer—local governments—that has not yet been discussed at
length. First, there has been a growing divide between states and
localities over sanctuary policies.265 As many cities have sought to
limit their cooperation with federal immigration enforcement
efforts, opponents of such policies have turned to states to overturn
them. Proposition 187 was such a ban.266 It has also appeared in a
number of recent state enforcement laws, including Arizona’s S.B.
1070 and similar laws in Missouri,267 Colorado,268 and Georgia.269
Second, as the federal government has challenged state enforcement mandates, it has also turned to local officials for support. To
be sure, sanctuary policies were dealt a major blow when opponents
leveraged Proposition 187 into a federal ban on noncooperation in
1996.270 Given the recent federal challenge against enforcement
mandates, however, the federal government now prominently features local opposition in its lawsuits against states.271
263. See Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A18 (reporting that Illinois was one of the first states seeking to
entirely withdraw from President Obama’s immigration program).
264. See Kirk Semple, Panel Is Facing Deadline on Immigrants’ Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2010, at A24.
265. See Laura Sullivan, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to
Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime Information
Center Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 568 (2009) (“Sanctuary policies vary in approch and
scope, but all distinguish between local and federal roles in the enforcement of immigration
statutes and restrict the role that local authorities will perform.”).
266. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
267. See MO. REV. STAT. § 67.307 (2012).
268. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-29-101 (2012).
269. See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-23 (2012).
270. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
271. See Declaration of Phoenix Police Chief Jack Harris at 2, United States v. Arizona, 703
F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/documents/declaration-of-jack-harris.pdf; Declaration of Santa Cruz County Sheriff
Tony Estrada at 2, Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ opa/documents/declaration-of-tony-estrada.pdf; Declaration of Tuscon
Police Chief Roberto Villaseñor at 2, Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, available at http://www.

1392

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1339

Third, local officials have also begun to turn to the federal government to support their efforts against immigration enforcement
conducted by other local governments. For example, the mayor of
Phoenix famously wrote a letter to the U.S. Attorney General asking
the Department of Justice to investigate the enforcement activities
of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office,272 which eventually led the
office to be removed from joint collaboration efforts with the federal
government.273
All of this complicates the traditional federal-state framework in
the immigration enforcement context. Yet it shows the many
creative ways that political actors at all levels have turned to venueshifting as a means of effectuating policy outcomes. Moreover, it
illustrates that even when state and local governments have not
been able to affect federal enforcement efforts as a matter of policy,
their reluctance and vocal opposition have had an influence. When
the federal government was actively pursuing large-scale employer
raids and neighborhood sweeps, there were many sensational accounts of local and state officials balking at the federal government’s
excessiveness.274 It is also worth noting the tremendous amount of
controversy that state and local opposition to Operation Secure
Communities has generated, especially given that this federal
program automatically turns fingerprint matching at the local law
enforcement level into an immigration screening system.275 Though
it is hard to predict how much direct influence any of this has had,
justice.gov/opa/documents/declaration-of-roberto-villasenor.pdf.
272. See Casey Newton & JJ Hensley, Gordon Calls for Inquiry into Arpaio, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 2008, at A1. To read a copy of the letter, see Letter from Phil Gordon,
Mayor, Phx., Ariz., to Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 4,
2008), available at http://www.azcentral.com/ic/pdf/arpaio-gordon-2008-investigation-letter.
pdf.
273. See Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Alters Disputed Program Letting Local Officers Enforce
Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at A9 (reporting that federal authorization for
Arpaio’s street enforcement efforts had been withdrawn); Yvonne Wingett, Arpaio Probe
Began in 2008, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 11, 2010, at A1 (describing the high-profile federal
investigation of Joe Arpaio).
274. See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, Patrick Says Promises Broken on Raid: Access Disputed
on Immigrants, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2007, at A1 (reporting that Massachusetts Governor
Deval Patrick criticized an immigration raid conducted by the federal government in New
Bedford).
275. Julia Preston, Deportation Program Sows Mistrust, U.S. Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2011, at A12.

2013]

THE STATES OF IMMIGRATION

1393

it is telling that the federal government has at times scaled down
enforcement activity as state and local protests have escalated, or
refined federal initiatives in response to state and local concerns.
2. Higher Education and Legalization for Undocumented
Students
An even more interesting development from a venue-shifting
perspective is the connection between state laws offering lower instate tuition to undocumented students and the Federal DREAM
Act, the legalization bill that has the best chance of being enacted
or incorporated into the next federal immigration compromise.276
This connection is all the more interesting because under the
benefit-restriction zeal of the 1990s, spurred in large part by
California’s Proposition 187,277 a federal provision was enacted to
limit the ability of states to grant preferential tuition to undocumented immigrants on the basis of residency.278 Not only did opponents of this federal policy find ways around it through careful
drafting of state law but only a few years after the 1996 reform,
these state efforts would serve as the basis for a powerful federal
push to provide undocumented college graduates with a path to
legal status.
In many ways, state interest in providing in-state tuition to
undocumented immigrants is a testament to how many children had
grown up in the United States as “Americans” but remained in the
shadow of its laws as undocumented immigrants. By striking down
a Texas law that sought to deprive undocumented students of a free
public education, the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe ensured them
access to primary school.279 But as college education has become
more important, and more undocumented students have come out
276. See Elisha Barron, Recent Development, The Development, Relief, and Education for
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 655 (2011) (opining that “the DREAM
Act still has a fighting chance”—albeit at an early point in the Obama administration’s
tenure).
277. See supra Part II.C.2.
278. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623(a) (2006) (“[A]n alien ... not lawfully present in the United
States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State ... for any postsecondary
education benefit unless a citizen ... is eligible for such a benefit.”).
279. 457 U.S. 202, 205, 230 (1982).
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of high school with limited options, states have begun to consider
possible solutions. One of these is whether to provide in-state tuition in public universities to undocumented residents280—a matter
that also involves significant jurisdictional overlap between federal
and state policy.
Support for expanding higher education opportunities for undocumented students found many ready outlets at the state level in the
late 1990s and the early 2000s.281 By that time, however, federal law
already prohibited states from granting tuition preferences to
undocumented students on the basis of residency unless they were
willing to grant such preferences to all students irrespective of
residency—thereby eliminating any preferences at all.282 As a result
states sought ways to regulate around the federal prohibition by
awarding tuition preferences not on the basis of residency per se but
rather on where the student attended and graduated high school.283
Legal challenges have been raised against these workarounds on the
ground that they conflict with federal law. As noted earlier, these
challenges have, tellingly, been spearheaded by the same political
actors—Kris Kobach and FAIR—who are defending state enforcement laws against similar claims of federal preemption at the same
time.284 Thus far, courts have sided with the states on this issue.285
From a venue-shifting perspective, it is telling how many states
enacted in-state tuition laws even with a federal restriction in place.

280. See Stella M. Flores, State Dream Acts: The Effect of In-State Resident Tuition Policies
and Undocumented Latino Students, 33 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 239, 240-41 (2010) (describing
different state approaches to providing in-state tuition to undocumented residents in public
universities).
281. See Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the Legislative
Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1757, 176484 (2009).
282. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205, 230.
283. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 859-60 (Cal. 2010)
(interpreting the California in-state tuition law based on high school attendance to not be
dependent on residency). For an argument that these laws are still preempted by federal law,
see Kris W. Kobach, Immigration Nullification: In-State Tuition and Lawmakers Who
Disregard the Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 507-17 (2007). For an argument that
Congress did not intend to, or cannot, restrict states from designating undocumented
immigrants as “residents,” see Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, the DREAM Act, and
Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 452-55 (2004).
284. See Preston, supra note 230, at A10.
285. See Martinez, 241 P.3d at 859-60.
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Rather than be deterred by the possibility of legal conflict, states
eagerly jumped in. Texas began this trend in June of 2001 and was
joined immediately by California, Utah, and New York. Ten other
states, including Kansas, Nebraska, and Maryland, followed
throughout the 2000s.286 There is, of course, political pressure on the
other side as well. Oklahoma, which passed its law in 2003, repealed it in 2007.287 Moreover, five states have explicitly passed laws
to prohibit the granting of in-state tuition.288 In any event, the
amount of state activity on this issue has been tremendous; more
than half of all states have considered bills on the matter.289 The
total tally currently stands at twelve states granting in-state
tuition,290 with California recently expanding their laws to allow
undocumented students to apply for and receive scholarships and
other financial aid.291
This has not escaped federal attention. Similar to the employer
sanctions in the 1970s, this campaign to support undocumented
students appears to have been jointly waged with similar efforts at
the federal level from the start. Immediately after Texas passed its
in-state tuition law, the Federal DREAM Act was first introduced
in Congress in August of 2001.292 At its most basic level, it sought
to repeal the higher-education provision from 1996 reforms by
“permit[ing] States to determine State residency for higher education purposes.”293 With this as the foundation, however, the DREAM
Act also took another major step: it provided a path to legalization
for undocumented students who attend college.294 As state activity
mounted, the DREAM Act was introduced several times throughout
286. See Olivas, supra note 281, at 1763-65.
287. Id. at 1776.
288. For an updated summary of the state activity in this area, see Ann Morse & Kerry
Birnbach, In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/in-state-tuition-and-unauthorizedimmigrants.aspx (last revised Nov. 28, 2012).
289. See Flores, supra note 280, at 240-41; Olivas, supra note 281, at 1764-84.
290. Morse & Birnbach, supra note 288 (explaining which states have passed legislation
allowing for in-state tuition).
291. See Nanette Asimov & Wyatt Buchanan, Brown OKs Student Aid for Illegal
Immigrants, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2011, at A1 (reporting that Governor Jerry Brown signed
the California DREAM Act).
292. The Dream Act of 2001, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001).
293. Id.
294. Olivas, supra note 281, at 1764.
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the 2000s, including a close vote in 2007 and 2010.295 Today, it is
considered the legalization program with the best chance of being
enacted.296
If state support for in-state tuition benefits and their struggle
against the 1996 law prompted the Federal DREAM Act, the legalization provision of the Federal DREAM Act also transformed instate tuition efforts. None of the in-state tuition laws contain
anything close to the legalization provision of the Federal DREAM
Act.297 Yet, starting in 2003, supporters began to explicitly refer to
their in-state tuition bills as “dream acts”: the Texas Dream Act, the
Maryland Dream Act, the California Dream Act.298 This connection
is striking because, as a legal matter, the legalization that is at the
core of the Federal DREAM Act appears worlds apart from its state
counterparts’ focus on in-state tuition. As a political matter, however, the connection between these two has been powerful for legalization supporters. Although the regulatory and fiscal impacts of
state dream acts have been minimal, they have been successfully
leveraged into strong political appeals for legalization at the federal
level.
***
As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, the
structure and incentives that make venue-shifting an appealing
political strategy appear to be alive and well. The immigration
proposals being debated are not the same as those in the past—nor
are the interests and concerns, which for many have been more
295. See Julia Preston, Bill for Immigrant Students Fails Test Vote in Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2007, at A16 (reporting that the DREAM Act failed to garner the sixty votes needed
to make it to the floor of the Senate in 2007); Julia Preston, Immigration Vote Leaves Policy
in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A35 (reporting that the DREAM Act failed to
achieve the sixty votes necessary to withstand a filibuster in the Senate).
296. For example, prominent Republican figures such as Marco Rubio seek to compromise
with Democrats and pass a form of the DREAM Act. See Jonathan Weisman, Rubio, in Appeal
to G.O.P.’s Conscience, Urges Compromise on Dream Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at A14.
297. Compare, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.051(m) (West 2011) (“[T]uition for a student
who is a citizen of any country other than the United States ... is the same as the tuition
required of other nonresident students.”), with S. 952, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011) (allowing a
deportable alien to gain United States citizenship if he or she meets certain domiciliary and
educational requirements).
298. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Md. to Weigh Own ‘DREAM’ Tuition Act, WASH. POST,
Dec. 30, 2010, at B1 (reporting that Victor Ramirez, senator and proponent of the Maryland
tuition bill, has dubbed the bill the “Maryland Dream Act”).
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focused on the enforcement of existing laws rather than the
adoption of new ones. Yet as a matter of policy making, states
appear to be playing a familiar role. Despite the lip service about
federalism and states’ rights, state involvement in immigration
appears to be part of a broader national effort to shape the future of
federal immigration policy. Even when their regulatory impact is
limited, state immigration laws have been politically effective in
shaping the immigration debates. And although both sides of the
most recent immigration controversies decry state policies that run
counter to their positions, both eagerly encourage state and local
action as a means of building long-term political momentum. The
goal today is the same as it has always been: comprehensive policy
reforms at the federal level. And once again, states are playing a
significant role towards that end.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF VENUE-SHIFTING
Drawing states into a contentious policy dispute like immigration
is an effective political strategy. Time and time again, law making
at the state level—often orchestrated in conjunction with federal
efforts to advance a specific policy objective—has framed the
national debate over immigration and shaped the course of immigration policy making. All of this has shown venue-shifting to be a
useful framework for understanding the role of states in the
immigration context. The central question is what implications
venue-shifting has with respect to traditional principles of federalism more generally. Moreover, questions remain as to what
implications venue-shifting might have for the emerging field of
“immigration federalism.” This Part comments on both, showing
how my theory both deviates from and questions many of the
assumptions that underlie the pillars of these two questions. It also
considers, however, what all this means for the substance of immigration policy making and the prospect of comprehensive immigration reform.
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A. Implications for Federalism
Federalism does not overlook instances when state policy making
interacts with federal policy making. Indeed, many believe that
state policy making can enhance federal efforts to address particularly challenging policy issues. Two reasons are traditionally given
for this. The first is that states serve as laboratories for policy experimentation. The second is that states offer policies tailored to the
unique and specific circumstances of a particular state. Both explanations have tremendous intuitive appeal and are frequently
posited in defense of state efforts to regulate immigration. Venueshifting, however, suggests that these rationales do not always bear
out, especially in the immigration context.
Let us start with states as laboratories.299 Given all the state
immigration regulations that have become federal law, one might
assume that states have served as an important ground for policy
experimentation in the immigration context. But that inference
would be mistaken.300 A central premise of the laboratory theory is
that states not only innovate on the policy front but that these
innovations are actually tested.301 It is only through implementation
that federal policymakers can know which policies are effective and
what kind of unintended consequences they might cause. Yet one of
the most striking aspects of state immigration regulations is that
they are almost never actually put into action. They are enjoined,
struck down, or simply not prioritized. Although eleven states
adopted employer sanctions before the federal government, none of
those states provided anything more than a token enforcement.
299. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may ... serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.”).
300. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter has made a similar argument, though on more formal
grounds. He concludes that state laws “do not internalize costs or yield replicable results.”
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States As Laboratories of Immigration
Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1673 (2011). My argument here is related but also simpler:
after making a political impact, states are usually not interested in enforcing, much less
testing, these laws anyway. States realize that they are not experimenting and they have no
interest in being laboratories. But they will continue to claim to be doing so, and to rely on
any other number of federalism rationales, if it serves the interests of the political actors
behind these laws.
301. See id. at 1680 (discussing how decentralized policy making leads to states
“produc[ing] evidence about the effectiveness of ... programs”).
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Few, if any, data on the effectiveness of employer sanctions were
collected from these “experiments” before the federal government
adopted it as a central pillar of our nation’s immigration policy.302
Indeed, if anything, the fact that states ultimately decided not to
prioritize or fully implement the employer sanctions that they enacted was the most significant lesson that could have been learned,
albeit one in which Congress seemed uninterested. The same could
be said of Proposition 187, which was enjoined from being implemented as law but nevertheless saw nearly every one of its provisions adopted into federal policy.303
There is also the argument that state immigration policy making
allows for tailored responses.304 Not all issues do well under a onesize-fits-all approach; regulatory flexibility is oftentimes as important as regulatory standardization. States are often believed to be
in a good position to design policies that are fitted to the particular
interests and specific circumstances of their state.305 Patterns of
immigrant settlement have always been unevenly distributed.306 As
a result, they tend to impact different states in different ways. Yet
this rationale also falters once we look more closely at the wide
variety of states that have responded to immigration and how they
have responded. It is surprising to think that California, Kansas,
and Massachusetts had such similar problems with undocumented
immigration in the 1970s that they all believed the same employer
sanction law would be perfectly tailored to their predicament.307 It
is also difficult to imagine that Alabama and South Carolina, each
with relatively small immigrant populations,308 saw themselves just
like Arizona in needing a more aggressive immigration enforcement
response.309

302. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 174-76, 181-83 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 118-20.
305. See, e.g., LARRY N. GERSTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 119-20
(2007) (discussing that different regions embody differing—and dynamic—“political cultures”).
306. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 574-75 (2008) (discussing immigration trends).
307. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
308. Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 306, at 574 n.21 (highlighting traditional immigrant
destinations but not listing either Alabama or South Carolina).
309. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
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This is not to say that states do not serve as laboratories of sorts
for federal policy making. Nor do I deny that state policies are in
some ways tailored to the states that enact them. It is simply that
state involvement in immigration is more often designed to test the
political influence of a proposal rather than its effectiveness as a
substantive policy. And to the extent that state laws are tailored to
the characteristics and circumstances of a state, it is much more
likely to be with respect to the partisan makeup of the state as a
policy-making venue at a given point in time rather than the specific conditions on the ground. Rather than traditional values of
federalism, this kind of experimentation and tailoring is more
aligned with venue-shifting as a means of federal policy making.
B. Implications for Immigration Federalism
In recent years, legal scholars have also begun to develop frameworks of federalism fitted specifically to the immigration context.
These have at times been referred to as “immigration federalism.”
I examine three of them here—steam-valve, cost accounting, and
institutional competence—and comment on how venue-shifting
either adds to or challenges their basic insights.
One of the first accounts of federalism fitted to the immigration
context was Peter Spiro’s “steam-valve” theory.310 Looking back historically, Spiro suggested that we might learn to tolerate and allow
some state restrictions on immigration because they would allow
those states, often teeming with anti-immigrant sentiment, to essentially “blow off steam” and not demand a more far-reaching federal response. He used the example of the escalating anti-Chinese
restrictions in California at the end of the nineteenth century to cast
light on the aftermath of Proposition 187. He speculated that if
more of these restrictions had been allowed to survive, the outrage
would have stabilized, and demand for Chinese exclusion at the
federal level would have dampened.311
Venue-shifting suggests, however, that states are just as likely to
regulate as a way of “building pressure” as “blowing off steam.”
States often design regulations to provoke controversy and draw
310. See Spiro, supra note 260, at 1627.
311. Id. at 1631-32, 1634-36.
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public attention.312 Irrespective of whether they are enforced, state
immigration regulations often have the effect of escalating an issue,
leading to even more regulations.313 Moreover, given that the goal
is often a federal response right from the start, states will unlikely
feel satisfied with a few state laws that they know are not capable
of having the actual impact they want.314 Recent developments seem
to illustrate this. Oklahoma passed one of the first immigration
enforcement laws in the most recent wave.315 Rather than being
quelled, however, that success, along with successes in other states,
only encouraged legislators to step up enforcement even further
with a follow-up law.316 Similarly, Arizona enacted S.B. 1070 after
it had already enacted an enforcement measure a year earlier.317
Though that earlier measure had survived judicial scrutiny318 and
the constitutionality of Proposition 187 remained pending, Arizona
aggressively considered other bills, including ones that would undermine the birthright citizenship.319 In both of these states,
successfully passing an immigration restriction only emboldened
legislators to pursue more.
In addition to the steam-valve theory, some see the involvement
of states as important because it allows a more accurate accounting
of the actual impact of immigration.320 Immigration might be set at
the federal level, but under this view, the federal government is also
not in the best position to account for the costs and benefits associated with its policies.321 In the 1990s, many argued that the antiimmigrant activity at the state level should be taken seriously
because it offered a window into how immigration disproportion312. Cf. Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act:
Blowing Off Steam or Setting Wildfires?, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 351-52 (2009).
313. See, e.g., id. at 330-35.
314. See, e.g., id. at 360-61.
315. See id. at 351-52, 355-56.
316. See Greater Protecting Victims of Human Trafficking Act of 2010, ch. 409, 2010 Okla.
Sess. Laws 1687, 1687-88.
317. See Legal Arizona Workers Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312.
318. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011).
319. See Marc Lacey, On Immigration, Birthright Fight in U.S. Is Looming, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2011, at A1.
320. Cf. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 805-06 (2008) (discussing the unequal impact of “unauthorized migration”
on states).
321. See, e.g., id. at 805 n.71.
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ately burdened states and localities more than the federal government.322 Many views exist on whether or why this might be the
case.323 Nevertheless, many argued that the involvement of states
was necessary to raise this issue in the federal debates.
Even if cost accounting is possible, state involvement can also
distort the cost calculations. Given that the political actors behind
these efforts are primarily interested in policy outcomes, they have
strong incentives to use states to conceal the costs, or exaggerate the
benefits, that are associated with the immigration policies they are
championing. For example, the structural design of S.B. 1070 seems
to exploit the intermediate position of states to sell its enforcement
mandate as a low-cost solution to the problem of undocumented
immigration. It did so by essentially pushing all the fiscal and social
costs of its enforcement up to the federal government and down to
localities. On one hand, nearly all the screening costs of implementing S.B. 1070 at the front end were forced onto local governments.324
This explained why so many local officials in Arizona protested the
law as another unfunded mandate.325 On the other hand, S.B. 1070
imposed all of the processing, detention, and removal costs on the
back end onto the federal government.326 Indeed, one of the federal
government’s main arguments against S.B. 1070 was that it would
“impermissibly shift the allocation of federal resources away from
federal priorities,” which were not focused on the kind of undocumented immigrants that Arizona’s law targeted.327 In the end, states
like Arizona often see little downside to these laws because they are
designed to impose few fiscal burdens on state coffers.
Instead of dismissing the role of states outright, some legal
scholars have suggested that states and localities might be asked to
play a more significant role in immigration.328 This is because they
322. See, e.g., GORDON H. HANSON, WHY DOES IMMIGRATION DIVIDE AMERICA?: PUBLIC
FINANCE AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO OPEN BORDERS 38-40 (2005).
323. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE
BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1-5 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6-immigration.pdf.
324. See, e.g., S.B. 1070, ch. 113, § 7, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 458.
325. See Garin Groff, Cities Uncertain What Impact SB 1070 Rules Will Have on Their
Wallets, Image, E. VALLEY TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), July 1, 2010.
326. S.B. 1070, § 2.
327. See Plaintiff ’s Motion, supra note 4, at 30-32.
328. See Huntington, supra note 320, at 789 & n.11.
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are simply more institutionally competent to address certain aspects
of immigration policy, such as integration and assimilation.329 As
such, more efforts should be made to encourage states to focus their
regulatory efforts on these and other immigration-related issues to
which they are better suited.
This view draws from institutional design principles of federalism, which posit that policy issues should be allocated to the level
that is in the best position to address them.330 Venue-shifting suggests that states may sometimes have strong incentives to regulate
beyond their institutional competence, especially if the goal is to
draw attention or send a message. But venue-shifting recognizes
that efforts can be made to change the incentive structure to encourage states to channel their regulatory efforts into productive
ends, to which they are in fact better suited than the federal government. Excessive reliance on venue-shifting, however, may also
stifle this kind of policy delineation in the immigration context.
States may become too reliant on federal immigration solutions to
what are essentially local problems. States often portray themselves
as victims in order to justify their involvement in immigration policy
making.331 They use this to assert a jurisdictional claim over the
issue.332 It is also politically expedient, as it allows them to deflect
blame for local problems, like budgetary shortfalls, onto the federal
government. This is what motivated Governor Wilson to support
Proposition 187 in the 1990s.333 Over time, however, states may
start to look to the federal government to solve problems that they
might actually be more institutionally competent to address. In
other words, the political incentives of venue-shifting might start to
erode the institutional incentives of federalism.

329. See, e.g., Rodríguez, supra note 306, at 581, 608-09 (designating integration as the
state and local governments’ responsibility because it is an immigration-related issue they are
well-suited to address).
330. See Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in
National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 803-04 & n.3 (2011) (discussing
institutional design relative to executive branch powers).
331. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 320, at 802 & n.60.
332. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
333. See WROE, supra note 142, at 42, 45-46; cf. Calavita, supra note 112, at 212 (arguing
that California’s earlier employer sanction law “shift[ed] attention away from the structural
sources of economic downturns and insulate[d] the system from responsibility”).
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C. Implications for Substantive Policy Making
State involvement in immigration has historically produced little
in the way of experimentation and tailored policy making. It also
introduces cost distortions and encourages shirking on the part of
states. I challenge that we can do better. In other words, rather than
clashing over state efforts to regulate immigration, I contend that
we might be better off focusing on enacting comprehensive immigration reforms at the federal level and, if necessary, to do so on a
regular basis. Indeed, one of the strongest criticisms against state
involvement in immigration policy making is that it distracts us
from efforts to reach an immigration compromise at the federal
level. And it is not only those opposed to recent state efforts to regulate immigration that emphasize the need for a federal response;
even those most directly responsible for state immigration laws
stress the need for action at the federal level.334 This appears to be
the one constant in today’s immigration debates: the need for comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level.
It is easy to assume that state efforts to regulate immigration
interfere with federal efforts to reach a comprehensive immigration
compromise. Yet, given the structure and incentives of our federal
system, it appears that the kind of jurisdictional conflict that surrounds the recent faceoff between the federal government and states
like Arizona and Alabama is simply how immigration reforms are
made. Venue-shifting allows political actors to shake up the policy
making process, to spur federal action in a system that is prone to
stalemate and inaction. State involvement may not always improve
how we talk about immigration as a country. It has, however, increased the likelihood that immigration will be talked about and
addressed as a matter of federal policy. This process is not pretty.
In many cases it works by painting the federal government into a
corner. But it is effective. Nearly every major federal immigration
reform in recent history, from IRCA in 1986 to IRRIRA in 1996, was
accompanied by sensational state efforts that set the stage for the
federal compromise to come.335 Nor are these modern reforms
unique; looking back, this pattern has repeated time and time
334. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 320, at 802 & n.60.
335. See supra Part II.B-C.
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again, from the state agitation that led to Chinese exclusion in the
1880s, to the state laws that led to the enactment of the literacy
requirement in the early twentieth century.336
This, of course, is not the only way that significant developments
in immigration policy can be made. Yet any reform of the policymaking process will likely require us to address the underlying
political incentives that drive state involvement in contentious
policy issues like immigration, and not simply the jurisdictional
boundaries that are supposed to define the state’s legal authority to
act. Striking down state immigration regulations—or even upholding them for that matter—is unlikely to have much of an effect on
the behavior of states if the purpose is to make a political impact
and compel federal action. Indeed, state laws that fail judicial scrutiny go on to become federal law just as often as those that manage
to survive. This is not to say that the legal challenges and debates
about whether states are constitutionally permitted to enact such
regulations are not important—they happen to be an important part
of how state regulations shape the national conversation over
immigration. If the goal is to change the behavior of states, however,
our analysis of venue-shifting suggests that we must address the
reasons why political actors seek to draw states into contentious
policy disputes like immigration and how states are able to exert
their influence on the policy-making process.
At the same time, we might not want to be too quick to dismiss
venue-shifting as a means of substantive policy making. For one, it
broadens our ability to process and wrestle with immigrationrelated issues, especially when the issue is prevented from making
it onto the federal agenda. Suggestions and concerns that fail to
receive a hearing in a federal forum can nevertheless arise in states
as alternative avenues into the national debates. Moreover, states
have proven to be powerful tools for drawing attention to the limitations and consequences of how our immigration regulations are
actually enforced. We may not all believe, as a nation, that Arizona’s
enforcement mandate is the right way to implement our existing
immigration laws. Nor is there much agreement on whether it is
appropriate for states to oppose federal initiatives that require
336. See supra Part II.A.
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federal-state information sharing, like Operation Secure Communities.337 But it is because of these faceoffs in our federal system that
important debates about different policy options are held. Over the
long term, the ebb and flow of this struggle may have helped to
create a federal immigration system that is far more flexible and
responsive than one would expect otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Immigration is a national issue and a federal responsibility. One
might ask why then states are so actively involved. This Article
offered an explanation by turning to the institutional structure of
immigration policy making. I argued that rather than as a means
of regulating immigration, states frequently act in order to shape
the federal policy-making process. I referred to this strategic role of
states as venue-shifting, and showed how it is made possible by the
basic structure of our federal system and the incentives it creates for
political actors. Through this lens, we saw why states are frequently
drawn into the center of the immigration controversy, and the role
and influence that they have had on the course of federal policy
making from the earliest immigration laws to the most recent
reforms.
There are good reasons why venue-shifting is so often employed
in the immigration context. Immigration is just too contentious, too
expansive, and too volatile an issue to be contained in the halls of
Congress or the chambers of federal courts. Immigration advocates
at all levels of the federal system seek to make political gains,
whether they come through a federal lawsuit or a local ordinance.
It should be no surprise that given the number and diversity of
states as distinct policy venues, states are an important part of this
strategy. As we saw, the IRCA was shaped in large part by the state
employer sanctions laws that were enacted in the preceding years.
The IIRICA was also influenced by states in the same way. States
do not ultimately make immigration policy. But they are a part of
the process that does.
337. For an account of some of the states that have spoken out against Operation Secure
Communities, see Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand
Fingerprint Program, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2012, at A10.
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At the same time, venue-shifting is not limited to immigration.
Given the many ways that state involvement can shift the locus of
policy making or reframe the issue underlying a dispute, there is no
shortage of matters in which their involvement might be sought,
from same-sex marriage to abortion. Of course, successful venueshifting to states is not always easy. For every side that may want
to alter the terms of the debate in this way, there is usually another
that will contest it to maintain the status quo. Moreover, states and
other venues may be drawn in to support competing positions, which
may ultimately cancel each other out. Political actors look for advantages wherever they can find them. Given this, opportunities for
state involvement in a policy dispute are nearly always welcomed,
even if not always by the same side.
In conclusion, venue-shifting does not help us resolve what kinds
of immigration policies are needed. Nor does it offer a better institutional alternative for policy making, assuming that the strategic
incentives behind venue-shifting can be quelled or altered. What it
does is offer us a better understanding of the political motivations
and structural roots behind state involvement in immigration. In
other words, it tells us a lot about what is actually happening. To
the extent that normative proposals require this kind of descriptive
insight, the explanation ventured here is an important step.

